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REVISITING NOVEL APPROACHES TO COMBATING THE
FINANCING OF CRIME: A BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED
BRUCE ZAGARIS*

T

HIS paper discusses recent approaches by the United States and international organizations in combating the financing of crime. In particular, it looks at efforts to construct an international financial enforcement
regime.
At present, the new transnational crimes take advantage of globalization, trade liberalization and exploding new technologies to perpetrate
diverse crimes and to move money, goods, services and people instantaneously for purposes of perpetrating violence for political ends.' Transnational crime groups and criminals live and operate in a borderless world.
Increasingly, transnational criminals are diversifying their crimes, instrumentalities, markets and networks. Their intelligence networks and the
coincidence of economic and political power enable them to quickly transfer parts of their operations and enterprises to territories that they can
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dominate (e.g., "gray areas" in which governments do not effectively con2
trol, including Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan and Yemen) and/or op3
erate surreptitiously (e.g., with sleeper cells). While the U.S. government
has determined that transnational organized crime and terrorism are national security threats and has implemented various initiatives to combat
4
transnational organized crime and terrorism, the U.S. government is actively seeking more significant policy and legal initiatives to conceptualize
and establish effective international enforcement regimes. Some policyU.S. legal system
makers believe that many more transformations in the
5
crimes.
transnational
new
the
are required to combat
The international community and countries such as the United States
have enacted a substantial amount of new legislation and have developed
initiatives to combat new transnational crimes, such as cybercrime, intellectual property crimes, international tax crimes, terrorism and organized
crime. 6 Globalization, free trade and information technology have facilitated borderless transnational criminal operations. As transnational
crime, especially terrorism, increases and transnational criminal groups
proliferate, national governments are challenged to prevent and combat
transnational criminals who operate in a borderless world.
Cybercrime exemplifies the difficulty that occurs when the law tries to
keep pace with the tremendous changes in technology that enable
criminals to perpetrate diverse crimes, such as theft of money in bank accounts, identity theft, pornography, hate crimes and a vast range of new
criminal behavior. The international community is struggling to develop
an enforcement regime, whereby they can use the new technology to assist
2. See GRAY AREA PHENOMENA: CONFRONTING THE NEW WORLD DISORDER (Max
G. Manwaring, ed. 1993) (discussing gray area phenomena, whereby terrorists and
criminals use portions of countries not effectively controlled to hide and operate
criminal enterprises).
3. See, e.g., Peter A. Lupsha, TransnationalOrganized Crime Versus the NationState, 2 TRANSNAT'L ORG. CRIME 21, 21-48 (1996) (analyzing threat of sleeper cells
in nation-states and suggesting steps that must be taken to combat them).
4. See Interview with the Hon. Richard A. Clarke, Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director, Global Issues and MultinationalAffairs, National Security Council,
Nov. 30, 1995, 1 TRENDS IN ORG. CRIME 5-9 (1996).
5. See, e.g., SENATOR JOHN KERRY, THE NEW WAR: THE WEB OF CRIME TH4AT
THREATENS AMERICA'S SECURITY 31 (1997).

6. On October 22, 1995, President Clinton used the occasion of his fourteen
minute speech before the fiftieth anniversary of the U.N. to announce a number

of new initiatives against transnational organized crime. See Remarks of President
Clinton to the United Nations on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Creation of the
United Nations, 31 WEEKLY COM. PREs. Doc. 1909 (Oct. 22, 1995) [hereinafter Remarks to the U.N.]. A later executive order extended economic sanctions against
certain Colombian narcotics trafficking organizations. See Blocking Assets and
Prohibiting Transactions with Significant Narcotics Traffickers, Exec. Order No.
12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,579 (Oct. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Anti-Drug Trafficking Executive Order]. For the text of President Directive 42 on transnational crime, see
White House, PresidentialDirective on International Organized Crime, Summary Sheet,
Oct. 22, 1995 [hereinafter PresidentialDirective].
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in the identification, investigation and prosecution of the cybercriminals.
In this regard, the proposed Council of Europe Convention Against Cybercrime provides a strong potential mechanism.
Intellectual property and counterfeiting crimes have grown tremendously in the last couple of decades. Criminals counterfeit everything
from software to cosmetics and clothing. The international community
and governments have tried a combination of international trade law,
such as Trade in Related Intellectual Property Services (TRIPS) and the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to criminalize transnational intellectual property crimes. For instance, in the United States,
trade associations such as the International Intellectual Property Association and the Motion Picture Society of America have exerted pressure on
the U.S. government to bring an action against Mexico because of the
alleged lack of criminal prosecution by the Mexican government against
persons who intentionally violate intellectual property law. Indeed, these
same U.S. trade associations succeeded in persuading the NAFTA signatories to include provisions requiring criminal prosecution and civil action
against violators of intellectual property law.
Money laundering is an example of the type of crime that governments and the international community have criminalized only since the
mid-1980s. Through international conventions, such as the 1988 U.N.
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, the international community has extended the use of a new anti-money laundering
enforcement regime globally. Signatories are required to criminalize
laundering offenses and are required to initiate asset forfeiture and confiscation as remedies. These conventions require a broad range of international judicial cooperation, including evidence gathering and extradition,
and suggest a range of more customized bilateral cooperation agreements.
Institutionally, the prevalence of money laundering has spawned the establishment of financial investigative (or intelligence) units (FIUs) around
the world. The Egmont Group, which is an association of FIUs, meets
regularly to facilitate cooperation among FIUs and develop uniform approaches to core issues. Anti-money laundering initiatives have given rise
to new organizations and groups, such as the Financial Action Task Force
on Anti-Money Laundering (FATF). Growing out of the industrial Group
of 7 meetings, FATF has developed cutting edge requirements on legal,
financial and external relations with respect to anti-money laundering provisions. Among the many legal transformations brought by anti-money
laundering laws is the erosion of bank and financial secrecy.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the
United States, the emphasis of the U.S. government and the international
community on counter-terrorism financial enforcement is increasing. The
U.S. government has invoked a war paradigm and initiated a comprehenPublished by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
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sive financial strategy aimed at detecting, through financial transfers,
transnational terrorist movements and plans, with the purpose of preventing new terrorist attacks. The strategy is designed to investigate, prosecute
and seize terrorist assets by applying many of the anti-money laundering
due diligence requirements commonly used by the private sector to
counter-terrorism. Simultaneously, the United States applies its economic
sanctions regime to terrorist states, persons and entities. The United
States strategy is to develop comprehensive international counter-terrorism financial enforcement.
While the international community has engaged in tax enforcement
cooperation for many years through the exchange of information provisions within income tax treaties and exchange of information agreements,
many national courts have traditionally taken the position that one country will not help collect the taxes of another country. Therefore, courts
typically refuse to enforce foreign tax judgments and even deny requests
for assistance in the absence of a binding international convention requiring assistance. During the last two or three decades, the international
community has developed multilateral conventions, such as the 1983
Council of Europe and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in
Tax Matters, to overcome the traditional judicial reluctance to help foreign tax authorities. Furthermore, international organizations of tax authorities have met regularly to develop uniform approaches, networks and
conventions to reduce gaps in tax laws and strengthen enforcement cooperation. Increasingly, national governments have criminalized tax fraud
and evasion and required extensive and draconian reporting regimes that
include administrative penal laws for non-compliance.
The international community has developed offshore blacklisting as a
means to accelerate compliance with new "soft law." In 1999 and 2000,
governments and international organizations continued their active efforts to increase regulatory and criminal enforcement of various laws to
stem the tide of transnational crime. These efforts were reflected in the
criminalization of various businesses and financial transactions, the imposition of new due diligence measures on the private sector, a concomitant
weakening of privacy and confidentiality laws, strengthened penalties for
non-compliance with regulatory efforts and new law enforcement techniques (e.g., undercover sting operations, wiretapping, expanded powers
to search homes and businesses and controlled deliveries).
A major development in 2000 was the almost simultaneous issuance of
blacklists against non-compliant organizations. Within a one-month period, the OECD issued its harmful tax competition initiative with a list of
tax havens that did not agree to make a public commitment to bring their
practices into compliance; the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) issued its
report on offshore financial centers (OFCs), classifying OFCs into three
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss3/4
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levels of compliance with international standards; and the FATF issued its
list of fifteen non-complying countries.
The simultaneous issue of blacklists was an attempt to jumpstart the
anti-money laundering enforcement regime and confer a greater status on
soft laws in international law and politics. The FATF's decision in October
2000 to continue blacklisting the fifteen noncooperative countries, together with the lack of any new commitments by the OECD harmful tax
competition initiative and the decision by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to take over the OFC work of the FSF, made companies, investors and a broad range of the private sector reconsider the structure of
their investments.
The convergence of the various initiatives shows a determination by
intergovernmental organizations to combine development of an international financial enforcement subregime, which includes international tax
and anti-money laundering policy, with the new international financial architecture, particularly the work by the FSF.
Countries such as Italy and the United States have pioneered national
legislation to combat organized crime. On December 15, 2000, the signing by 124 countries of the U.N. Convention on Transnational Organized
Crime in Palermo, Italy signified the start of the construction of an international enforcement regime against transnational organized crime. Its
three protocols: 1) to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons;
2) to combat the smuggling of migrants by land, air and sea; and 3) to
curb the illicit transfer of firearms, represent a new effort to attack transnational organized crime activity. The Convention employs some of the
same methods as the U.N. Counterdrug Convention (e.g., requiring signatory countries to enact anti-money laundering and asset forfeiture techniques against transnational organized crime).
The challenges of transnational criminality at the millennium are substantial. Unless nation-states become better at networking and cooperating with each other, they will lose power to transnational criminals who
operate in a borderless world. In order to gain and maintain respect for
their democracies, States must develop international enforcement regimes
that are balanced and maintain fundamental and international human
rights. To achieve success in combating transnational crime, criminal justice authorities must become more adept at working with non-criminal
legal professionals, diplomats, international affairs experts and a host of
other specialists. For instance, criminal justice professionals must study
international organization theory and chart the creation, emergence and
evolution of international enforcement regimes. Indeed, new transnational crimes and responses in the context of globalization will continue to
pose a significant challenge to the lives of legal and other professionals.
This paper examines recent approaches by the United States and the
international community to combat the financing of various types of international crime. In particular, it looks at narcotics, organized crime, taxaPublished by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
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tion, economic sanctions, money laundering and counter-terrorism
financial enforcement. The selection was based on considerations of
space and allocation of work among our panel. In particular, one of the
panelists is focusing on forfeiture, 7 which normally would have been a focus of this paper.
I.

UNITED STATES NOVEL APPROACHES TO COMBATING THE FINANCING
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME

The United States government has taken the position that many
forms of transnational crime are a national security threat and has taken
various initiatives to combat such threats by continuously and actively seeking more significant policy and legal initiatives to conceptualize and establish effective regimes. Some leading policymakers have worked to develop
more transformations in both the United States and international legal
8
systems.
Especially in the 1990s, the U.S. government enacted a substantial
amount of new legislation and developed initiatives to combat transnational organized crime. Included in these efforts was the designation of
certain persons as narcotics kingpins and then using economic sanctions
against them, such as blocking their assets.9 The United States has taken
significant measures against drug trafficking, anti-money laundering,
transnational corruption, trafficking in human beings, international terrorism, fiscal offenses and organized crime. 10
An essential component of the U.S. strategy to combat the financing
of transnational crime has been asset forfeiture, especially civil and administrative forfeiture. At times, the United States has prioritized confiscating
the crime proceeds and disrupting criminal groups over bringing persons
to justice. The dangers of counter-terrorism, however, do not always allow
the luxury of deferring arrests to try to get to the upper echelons of crimi11
nal groups.
7. For an earlier discussion by this author, see Bruce Zagaris, Asset Forfeiture
Internationaland ForeignLaw: An EmergingRegime, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 446 (1991).
8. See, e.g., KERRY, supra note 5, at 31 (arguing that U.S. legal "instruments"

are too antiquated to combat transnational criminal organizations).
9. See Remarks to the U.N., supra note 6 (proposing five initiatives to U.N. that
would help combat transnational organized crime). For a discussion of the economic sanctions, see the Anti-Drug Trafficking Executive Order and the Presidential Directive, supra note 6.
10. See Bruce Zagaris, Clinton Administration Prepares International Organized
CrimeInitiative, 12 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 196, 196-97 (1996) (discussing activities of U.S. Executive during Clinton Administration); U.S. Congress Considers Suggestion on Combating International Organized Crime, 12 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP.
116, 116-20 (1996) (same).
11. See WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL STRATEGY 7 (May 1998)
(proposing asset seizure of international criminals as principal law enforcement
objective).
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The United States has served as an international pioneer in many of
the organizational aspects of combating transnational crime, including the
financial aspects of crime. For instance, the United States has posted a
variety of liaison enforcement officers overseas, helped transform legal regimes and developed bilateral law enforcement working groups on specific areas of transnational crime. The United States has also given
technical and financial assistance to create training centers-such as the
International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest-and to enable judicial enforcement directed against transnational organized crime in areas
like Central and Eastern Europe.
A.

Narcotics Control

Since the 1980s, the U.S. government has enacted a number of laws to
combat the financial aspects of narcotics trafficking. For instance, the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 criminalized money laundering. It established Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs), requiring that all currency
transactions of $10,000 or more be reported to the federal government.
The Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act of 1988, part of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, added three new elements: 1) reduced
threshold-reporting requirement permitting geographical targeting; 2)
2
erosion of financial privacy; and 3) enhanced penalties for violators.'
Section 4702 of the 1988 Act required the U.S. Department of Treasury to negotiate information-sharing agreements concerning financial
data with key drug producing or drug-transit states. The so-called Kerry
Amendments, named after SenatorJohn F. Kerry, were designed to permit
United States and other national enforcement forces to go after the profits
of drug trafficking in order to reduce the ability of drug dealers to launder
narco-profits; in effect, to hit these criminals where it hurts most-their
pocket books. 13 The United States, however, was only able to conclude a
few agreements and abandoned its efforts to secure such agreements.
Part of the strategy of the Bush administration has been to focus on
high value traffickers, operations and drug shipments. The goal is to remove key persons from the trafficking chain and thereby disrupt the oper14
ations of narcotics cartels and traffickers.
A major component of United States counter-narcotics enforcement
has been the use of task forces, operated by the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program. OCDETF utilizes the expertise of multiple federal agencies, as well as a number of state and local
law enforcement offices, to coordinate investigations and prosecutions of
sophisticated and diversified criminal drug-related and money laundering
enterprises. The expertise of these groups are quite broad, covering fi12. See Raphael Francis Perl, The United States, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
72-73 (Scott B. MacDonald & Bruce Zagaris eds., 1992).

ON DRUG CONTROL

13. Id. at 73.
14. Id.
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nancial and tax information and data on trafficking organizations and
gang activity. Prior to the reorganization that created the Department of
Homeland Security, the participating federal agencies included the Drug
Enforcement Administration, Customs, Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms,
Coast Guard, U.S. Marshals Service, Internal Revenue Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Justice Department's Tax and Criminal Divisions
and Immigration and Naturalization Service. 15 OCDETF operates in thirteen regions. The Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees (LECCS),
16
chaired by U.S. attorneys, actively assist OCDETF.
Narcotics provisions borrowed the concept of forfeiture provisions
from the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
They allow the government to institute criminal forfeiture proceedings
against any defendant in a felony case covered by the statute, including
drug offenses and fraud. These provisions require persons convicted of a
listed offense resulting in imprisonment of more than one year to forfeit
any property "constituting, or derived from any proceeds" obtained as the
result of the crime and any property used to commit or facilitate the
crime. 17
An important difference between the Controlled Substances Act and
RICO is that in the former, the government enjoys a presumption in support of forfeiture if it shows by a preponderance of the evidence at the
criminal trial that the property was acquired at the time the crimes were
committed or within a reasonable time thereafter and that "there was no
likely source for the property other than the violations of the controlled
substances law." 18
During the 1980s, the Uniform Controlled Substance Act and the federal RICO statute served as models for state forfeiture statutes. Virtually
all of the states in the United States enacted some form of the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act.' 9
B.

Organized Crime

The most utilized provisions directed at combating the financing of
crime are those found in the RICO statute 20 and the Controlled Substances Act.

21

The RICO forfeiture provisions state that any interest acquired or
maintained from acts prohibited by the RICO provisions are subject to
15. Id. at 75.
16. Id. at 76.
17. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2005).
18. Id. § 853(d) (2). For a useful discussion of U.S. forfeiture laws, see Robert
D. Luskin, Forfeiture Status: A Brief Survey and History, in THE SECOND NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON FORFEITURES AND ASSET FREEZES 8 (ABA Criminal Justice Sec., 1992).
19. Luskin, supra note 18, at 9 (citing 9 Uniform Law Annotated 198 et seq.).

20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2001).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss3/4

8

Zagaris: Revisiting Novel Approaches to Combating the Financing of Crime:

2005]

A BRAVE NEW WORLD REViSITED

517

forfeiture. 2 2 Additionally, any property "constituting, or derived from, any
proceeds" obtained directly or indirectly from racketeering activity is subject to forfeiture. The statute defines property to include real property,
tangible and intangible personal property. Many states have enacted
23
RICO statutes that contain forfeiture provisions.
The U.S. government, in cooperation with Italy and international organizations, such as the United Nations, has been active in helping interested countries, such as Mexico, develop their own organized crime
legislation to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of organized
crime. As a result, Mexico enacted a Federal Organized Crime Act on
October 18, 1996.24
C.

25

Anti-Money Laundering

Since the initiation of international anti-money-laundering (AML) efforts in the mid-1980s, various substantive mandates have been established.2 6 Nations are now required to criminalize money-laundering
activities through the proactive tracing, freezing and seizing of the instrumentalities and proceeds of serious crime and the forfeiting of them to
law enforcement personnel. 27 Financial institutions and their employees
must practice what is known as due diligence. They are bound by law to
help law enforcement officials by "knowing their customers;" identifying
and reporting suspicious transactions to authorities; training employees;
hiring compliance officers; and obtaining outside audits of their compliance with AML standards. Neither governments nor financial institutions
may cite secrecy or privacy as a reason for refusing to follow any of these
obligations.
The United States spurred the growth of the AML regime early on
and has been a leader in its expansion to cover more entities, activities and
nations ever since. The main AML provisions are found in Titles 12, 18
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2001).
23. Luskin, supra note 18, at 9.
24. See Rodrigo Labardini, Mexico's Federal Organized Crime Act, 11 U.S.-MEx.
L.J. 133 (2003) (focusing on drug trafficking as most pervasive form of organized
crime in Mexico in relation to Mexico's organized crime law).
25. This and the following sections are taken from Bruce Zagaris, The Merging
of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-TerrorismFinancialEnforcement Regime After
September 11, 2001, 22 BERKELEYJ. OF INT'L L. 124 (2004).
26. For background on some of the early anti-money laundering (AML) law,
see Bruce Zagaris & Sheila M. Castilla, Constructingan InternationalFinancialEnforcement Subregime: The Implementation of Anti-Money-Laundering Policy, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 871, 872-78 (1993).
27. The purpose of forfeiture is to disable the criminal from continuing to
perpetrate crimes and to distribute to law enforcement and/or victims the ill-gotten gains. Indeed, a good portion of the budgets of law enforcement agencies in
the U.S. and other countries comes from forfeiture. An enormous cottage industry
dealing with the freezing and forfeiture of assets has arisen. For background on
AML forfeiture laws, see DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE
CASES (2004).
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and 31 of the U.S. Code. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA),28 a precursor to AML efforts, was intended to deter money laundering and the use
of secret foreign bank accounts by improving the detection and investigation of criminal, tax and regulatory violations. It demanded an investigative "paper trail" for large currency transactions by establishing regulatory
reporting standards and requirements, and imposed civil and criminal
29

penalties for noncompliance.
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986,30 part of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, was a watershed development in U.S. money movement
regulation. It created three new criminal offenses for money laundering
activities by, through or to a financial institution: 1) knowingly helping
launder money; 2) knowingly engaging in (including by being willfully
blind to) a transaction of more than $10,000 that involves property acquired through criminal activity; and 3) structuring transactions to avoid
the BSA reporting requirements. It authorized, for the first time, the
seizure and forfeiture of cash, or property related to such cash, where the
31
owner causes a financial institution to fail to file a required BSA report.
The Money Laundering Control Act directed banking regulators to
require insured financial institutions to establish and maintain reporting
procedures that comply with the BSA.3 2 The Money Laundering Control
Act also amended the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) 33 by clarifying
the type and amount of information a financial institution can voluntarily
give law enforcement authorities without notifying its customers. 34 Additionally, the Money Laundering Control Act amended and restricted the

BSA exemption requirements, whereby banks obtained an exemption for
various customers whose business required them to work with and deposit
considerable amounts of cash (e.g., restaurants, laundromats and
nightclubs) .35
28. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
29. See, e.g., I.R.S. Currency Transaction Report Form 4789 (requiring banks
to report any transfer of funds in amount greater than $10,000). In some instances, this monetary threshold can sink as low as $3,000. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.29
(2004).
30. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.
3207 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2001)).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (Supp. V 1987) (providing civil forfeiture provisions); 18
U.S.C. § 982 (Supp. V 1987) (detailing criminal forfeiture provisions); see Charles
Plombeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
and Bank Secrecy, 22 INT'L LAw. 69, 81-82 (1988) (discussing forfeiture).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(s) (1) (Supp. V 1987); see 12 U.S.C. § 1953 (1982).
33. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641
(codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9305.
34. Money Laundering Control Act, § 1353(a)-(b) (amending Right to Financial Privacy Act §§ 1103, 1109, 1113, codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 3403(c), 3409, 3413
(1) (Supp. V 1987)).
35. Id. Section 1353(a)-(b) authorized financial institutions-or officers, employees or agents thereof-to disclose identifying information concerning any individual or account involved in any suspected illegal transaction. This section of
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The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198836 strengthened the AML scheme by
significantly increasing civil and criminal sanctions for laundering crimes
and BSA violations, including forfeiture of "any property, real or personal,
involved in a transaction or attempted transaction" in violation of the reporting laws 3 7 and requiring more precise identification and recording of
cash purchases of certain monetary instruments. In addition, the AntiDrug Abuse Act allows the Department of the Treasury to obligate financial institutions to file additional, geographically targeted reports; 38 requires the Treasury to negotiate bilateral international agreements
covering the recording of large U.S. currency transactions and the sharing
of such information; 39 and increases the criminal sanctions for tax evasion
when money from criminal activity is involved.
The Housing and Community Development Act of 199240 allows regulators to close or seize financial institutions that violate AML statutes by
suspending or removing institution-affiliated parties that have violated the
BSA or have been indicted for money laundering or criminal activity
under it, by appointing a conservator or receiver or by terminating the
institution's charges. The Housing and Community Development Act further forbids any individual convicted of money laundering to engage in
unauthorized participation in any federally insured institution.
Additionally, the Housing and Community Development Act required
Treasury to issue regulations compelling national banks and other depository institutions to identify which of their account holders (other than
other depository institutions or regulated broker dealers) are non-bank
financial institutions (e.g., money transmitters or check-cashing services).
Pursuant to the Housing and Community Development Act, the Treasury,
along with the Federal Reserve, promulgated regulations obligating financial institutions and other entities that cash checks, transmit money or perform similar services to maintain records of domestic and international
wire transfers so that they can be made available for law enforcement investigations. The Housing and Community Development Act also established a BSA Advisory Group that includes representatives from the
the 1986 Act also empowered courts, pursuant to grand jury subpoena, to order
financial institutions not to notify affected customers of the existence of the sub-

poena or of the information revealed to the grand jury. Id.
36. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
37. 31 U.S.C. § 531 7 (c) (2001).
38. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.26 (2004).
39. Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 4702 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5311); see 134 CONG.
REc. § 15,993 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (passing Amendment 3697). The Kerry
Amendment required the President to impose penalties and sanctions on recalcitrant governments when the Treasury advised the President or formally reported
that a foreign country was not negotiating in good faith to reach an agreement. Id.
§ 4702(e).
40. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550,
106 Stat. 3672 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
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Departments of Treasury and Justice, the Office of National Drug Control
Policy and other interested persons and financial institutions. The
group's main goal is to develop harmonious private-public cooperation to
prevent money laundering.
The Housing and Community Development Act also gave Treasury
the authority to require financial institutions to adopt AML programs that
include internal policies, procedures and controls; designation of a compliance officer; continuation of an ongoing employee-training program;
and an independent audit function to test the adequacy of the program.
Financial institutions and their employees are also required to file suspicious activity reports on transactions relevant to possible violations of law
or regulations. The Housing and Community Development Act however,
protects institutions and their employees from civil suits arising from such
reports. The American Bankers' Association and the banking industry
had long sought such a safe harbor.4 1 A financial institution or employee,
however, may not disclose to the subject of a referral or grand jury subpoena that a criminal referral has been filed or a grand jury investigation
has been started concerning possible money laundering or violation of the
BSA. Employees who improperly disclose information concerning a grand
jury subpoena for bank records are subject to prosecution.
Together, the above-mentioned requirements comprise the due diligence standards imposed on institutions covered by AML laws. 42 They re-

present far-reaching mandates of information sharing between private
entities and governmental law enforcement agencies. They override privacy statutes in the name of enhanced crime-fighting capabilities. They
also erode the contractual and ethical principles of privacy and confidentiality that are important to banks, financial institutions and intermediaries,
43
as well as professionals involved in the international transfer of wealth.
Thus in 1998, when new regulations were proposed that would have
required banks and eventually other financial institutions to develop
"Know Your Customer" programs, 44 the industry balked. Bankers recog41. For more information on the ABA's involvement in the U.S. AML scheme,
see ANTONIO CALZADA ROVIROSA ET AL., ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND ANTI-TER.
RORIST FINANCING POLICY IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH ERA:

A

PRELIMINARY ANALY-

SIS OF THE IMPACT ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 4.2.1 (2002).

42. Other statutes also added to the standards of due diligence. See, e.g.,
Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-310,
112 Stat. 2941 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5341 (2005)) (requiring Treasury to work with state and local officials and to plan and implement national AML
strategy).
43. See the discussion of confidentiality in Antony G.D. Duckworth, The Trust

Offshore, 32

VAND.

J.

TRANSNAT'L

L. 879, 927-29 (1999) (discussing differences in

culture regarding confidentiality with financial affairs throughout different
countries).
44. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and
the Office of Thrift Supervision simultaneously proposed substantially similar
rules. See, e.g.,
Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,536 (proposed Dec. 7, 1998).
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nized the broad implications for private banking and offshore accounts
that the imposition of such requirements would have in forcing them to
design, implement and regularly update and adjust their "Know Your Customer" internal control systems. Due to enormous opposition from an
unusual coalition of private sector groups, both 45from the far left and far
right, the proposed regulations were withdrawn.
The private sector groups were not appeased for long. Just two and a
half years later, the USA PATRIOT Act 46 amended section 352 of the BSA,
requiring financial institutions to practice enhanced due diligence on
high-risk products, including those aimed at servicing persons on certain
lists of designated terrorists and Senior Foreign Political Figures (also
known as Politically Exposed Persons or PEPs); private banking clients;
certain financial intermediaries; foreign shell banks; foreign correspondent accounts; as well as transactions with non-cooperative countries and
territories. 4 7 Although not quite as stringent as the earlier proposed reguand indeed
lations, the new requirements were similar in many respects
48
rules.
Customer"
Your
"Know
as
to
referred
are often
American leadership on the international financial enforcement
front peaked in 2001 with new withholding regulations that had a dramatic impact on foreign investment in the United States. They required
foreign investors to reveal the ultimate beneficial ownership of complex
structures that include multiple layers of businesses or else incur a thirtyone percent withholding tax on all receipts from their U.S. investments,
including dividends, capital gains, royalties and interest. 49 Fiduciaries and
their counsel had to review over 200 pages of extremely complex rules that
distinguish among complex, simple and grantor trusts and repeatedly
cross-reference various sections of the Internal Revenue Code and Internal Revenue Service regulations. 5 0 Understanding the dense and compli45. See, e.g., Know Your Customer, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,845 (withdrawn Mar. 29,
1999); Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Disputed Bank Plan Dropped; Regulators Bow to Privacy
Fears,WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1999, at E01 (reporting that civil liberties activists, both
liberal and conservative, complained rules would expand government's ability to
track people).

46. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
47. The FATF later incorporated the idea into its 2003 revision of its Recommendations. See Press Release, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, New Anti-Money Laundering Standards Released (June 20, 2003),
available at http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2789401

1_1_11 ,00.html.
48. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON
(2001); see also BASEL

FOR BANKS
DATED

KYC

RISK MANAGEMENT

BANKING SUPERVISION, CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSOLI-

(2003) (supplementing former).

49. See Fredrickson & Byron, P.A., IRS' New Withholding Rules for Nonresident
Aliens (2001), at http://www.fredlaw.com/articles/tax/tax_01_02_des.html (explaining consequences for not following rules).
50. To better understand how difficult it was for the industry to understand
the new rules, seeJonathan Crowther, New US. WithholdingRules Explained (Dec. 1,
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cated language was all the more difficult for non-English speakers. Hence,
there arose a proliferation of model "Know Your Customer" agreements
51
with countries less than ninety days before the regulations took effect.
Banks and fiduciaries also needed to enforce the Qualifying Intermediary Regulations by implementing a new bureaucracy, complete with reg52
ular audits by the IRS or another entity approved by the IRS.
Simultaneously, they had to review, with the aid of newly purchased bureaucratic software, the latest changes to the U.S. unilateral extraterritorial export control laws, such as the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act. 53 They also had to buy separate software and hire separate compliance officers for the Office of Foreign Asset Control regulations. Indeed, due to the complex nature of the two sets of regulations, it
would be foolhardy to try to implement both through one compliance
officer.
D.

Economic Sanctions

The United States has used economic sanctions against drug traffickers, terrorists, organized criminals (e.g., narco-kingpins) and money launderers. In October 1995, President Bill Clinton signed an executive
order 5 4 to freeze any assets of the Cali cartel, 55 which at the time was allegedly responsible for eighty percent of the cocaine and fifteen percent of
the heroin entering the United States. 5 6 President Clinton said he had
directed his Attorney General and the Secretaries of the Treasury and
State to identify countries that help in money laundering and to notify
them that, unless they adhere to the international standards set forth in
the FATF's Forty anti-money-laundering recommendations, the United
States would consider imposing sanctions that could prevent them from
2000), at http://www.getyourmoneyworking.com/2001/JAN/27/WealthManage
ment/Tax/DOl 127240.html.
51. See, e.g., Guernsey Financial Services Commission, New US. Withholding
Tax Rules (Aug. 1, 2000), at http://www.gfsc.guernseyci.com/news/archive/us
witholdingtax.html (making available online generic non-US investor "qualified intermediaries" agreement with IRS).
52. See TIM BENNETT, TOLLEY'S INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES AFFECTING FINANCIAL HAVENS 124-25 (2001) (discussing qualifying intermediary (QI) regime).
53. Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, Pub. L. No. 106-20, 113 Stat.
1606, 1626-1636 (1999) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908).

54. Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,579 (Oct. 24, 1995).
55. Remarks to the U.N., supra note 6; see also John F. Harris, U.N. Anniversary
Celebration Opens with Notes of Discord: Clinton Urges Global Effort Against Crime, WASH.
POST, Oct. 23, 1995, at A01 (providing background on speech); Alison Mitchell,
U.S. Freezes Assets of Cartel in new Effort Against Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1995, at
All (same).

56. For additional discussion of the executive order on which this discussion

is based, see Bruce Zagaris, Constructing a HemisphericInitiativeAgainst Transnational
Crime, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1888, 1888-92 (1996).
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elecdoing business in the United States and prevent them from making
57
tronic transfers of money through banks in the United States.
The executive order, issued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 58 (IEEPA), authorizes the President to take action in
the case of an "unusual and extraordinary threat... to the national security." 59 It requires U.S. financial institutions to search for and freeze accounts held in the names of persons or companies determined by the
government to assist or have a significant role in international drug trafficking. 60 The order forbids U.S. businesses and officials from trading
with those individuals and front companies. 6 1 Pursuant to the executive
order, the United States has identified principals in the Cali cartel and
other narcotics organizations whose property would be subject to the
freeze. All of these individuals are based outside the United States.
The most innovative substantive legal component of the Clinton effort to combat organized crime was the decision to use the IEEPA to
freeze assets and try to prevent U.S. persons from dealing with companies
owned and/or controlled by drug traffickers. This measure logically extends from the finding in 1986, by former President Ronald Reagan, that
international drug trafficking poses a serious threat to the U.S. national
security, a finding reiterated many times thereafter. The measures are an
attempt to impose an economic embargo on seemingly more legitimate
enterprises of cartels, because the United States will try to persuade other
countries to join its economic embargo against the allegedly criminal
enterprises.
The Clinton executive order is an extension of the threat to identify,
isolate and punish countries and financial institutions that do not comply
with international standards of anti-money laundering. It is based on the
1988 amendments introduced by Senator Kerry to the 1988 Anti-Drug
Abuse Act.6 2 Jonathan Winer, who served as a Kerry staffer, was Assistant
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement in the
57. Remarks to the U.N., supra note 6.
58. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1708 (1988)).
59. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (a) (1988).
60. See Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,579 (Oct. 24, 1995).
61. Id. For further discussion of the executive order, see Bruce Zagaris, Clinton Administration Issues Order Blocking Assets and Prohibitingwith Significant Narcotics

Traffickers, 11

INT'L ENFORCEMENT

L. REP. 484 (1995) (surveying prohibitions on

trade with businesses in response to Clinton Administration's desire to freeze assets from money laundering).
62. See 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690 § 4702 (to be codified
at 31 U.S.C. § 5311) (providing critical analysis of Kerry Act provisions); 134 CONG.
REC. S15,993 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (passing Amendment 3997 introduced by
Senator Kerry); see also Bruce Zagaris, DollarDiplomacy: InternationalEnforcement of
Money Movement and Related Matters-A United States Perspective, 22 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 465, 476-79 (1989) (explaining steps taken by federal govern-

ment to fight narcotics trafficking by tracking international transactions involving
large sums of U.S. currency).
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Clinton administration. The citing of, and threat to sanction, transgressor
countries and financial institutions is an effort to force other countries to
pay better attentio:i and adhere to U.S. and international enforcement
policies. The difficulty is finding an internationally acceptable method to
evaluate countries that have been deficient in implementing anti-money
laundering procedures.
E.

Criminal and Quasi-CriminalTax Offenses

The proactive use of criminal and quasi-criminal law concerning
transnational tax matters is a unique facet of U.S. criminal and enforcement policy. U.S. citizens and residents for tax purposes must declare and
pay taxes on their worldwide income. The aggressive use by such persons
and business entities of offshore entities, various mechanisms to obtain
deductions, conceal income and misstate income may constitute tax
crimes. 63 Criminal provisions for the same conduct may also apply under
Title 18 of the United States Code. Provisions of the Code include those
for conspiracy, 64 false statements to government agencies 65 and mail
66
frauds.
A number of federal programs exist to target certain types of business
transactions, transactions with certain countries and entries of persons to
and from the United States. Various inter-agency investigations and computer programs can assist in both investigations and prosecutions. 67 The
use of these programs has increased and become more effective following
changes made to U.S. law enforcement in the aftermath of terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001.
The United States has raised revenue by targeting multinational enterprises that are perceived as not paying their fair share of taxes. The
perception is based partly on the belief that these enterprises either shift
profits to related enterprises in low tax countries or arbitrarily shift the
costs of international operations to U.S. enterprises, thereby reducing net
income and taxes owed the United States. As a result of the decrease in
63. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1988) (discussing evading tax liability); id. § 7203
(Supp. 1993) (describing consequences of failing to file tax return, supply information or pay tax); id. § 7206 (1988) (filing false documents, including returns);
id. § 7602(2) (aiding or assisting in preparation of false return); id. § 7207 (falsifying documents as to any material matter).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (detailing mode by which violation may occur).
65. Id. § 1001.
66. Id. § 1341.
67. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris & David R. Stepp, Criminaland Quasi-CriminalCustoms Enforcement Among the U.S., Canada and Mexico, 2 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

337, 380 (1992) (discussing Treasury Enforcement Compliance System (TECS),
computer program to collect and review financial and immigration records from
multiple agencies).
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taxes owed to the United States, a series of laws and regulations in the
68
transfer pricing area evolved.
The U.S. tax laws and regulations have dramatically increased the
amount of recordkeeping and reporting required of multinational enterprises. 69 These new requirements are accompanied by a major rise of severe economic penalties and loss of procedural rights for taxpayers who
do not comply. 70 Simultaneously, the Internal Revenue Service substantially improved its procedural rights. Consequently, tax authorities are
able to demand information, extend the statute of limitations, prevent the
introduction of foreign documents not immediately available to them during an examination 71 and completely disregard records where the tax72
payer has not timely furnished such information.
U.S. tax authorities have concluded tax information and related mutual assistance agreements with their counterparts to provide improved
means for tax agents to obtain and verify information and documents
from multinationals directly from their foreign counterparts.
II.

POST-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: THE U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM FINANCIAL
73
ENFORCEMENT REGIME-THE MERGING OF AML, CTFE AND SANC-rIONS

Shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President Bush
issued a series of executive orders extending and tightening counter-ter68. The United States has imposed penalties on multinational enterprises in
transfer pricing cases. The Internal Revenue Code describes transfer pricing as
follows:
[T]he Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations,

trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income of any such organizations, trades, or
businesses.

I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
69. For example, the IRS requires maintenance of very detailed records on
how transfer pricing is figured contemporaneous with the filing of income tax returns. See I.R.C. §§ 6038A, 6039C (1986) (requiring information with respect to
certain foreign-owned corporations and foreign corporations engaged in U.S. business); see also id. § 6038A(b) (detailing information secretary may prescribe by regulation). The appointment of agents is also required in the U.S. where ones do
not exist, allowing multinational enterprises to be served summons. Id.
§ 6038A(b) (1).
70. The Internal Revenue Code imposes penalties of $1,000 for each year in
which the reporting corporation fails to maintain information and records as required by § 6038A(b). Id. § 6038A(d).

71. Id. § 982(a). If the taxpayer, however, establishes reasonable cause for the
failure to provide the documentation requested, the documents may be introduced. Id. § 982(b).
72. Id. § 6038A(d) (3) (stating that treatment of such transaction is within discretion of secretary).
73. This section is derived substantially from Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the
Counter-Terrorismand Anti-Money-Laundering Regimes, 34 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 45,

48-73 (2002).
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rorism financial enforcement (CTFE) laws, which are intended to dry up
the funding of terrorists and terrorist organizations. These orders were
followed by the establishment of new investigative teams in numerous law
enforcement agencies and the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, which
criminalized various business and financial transactions, expanded law enforcement powers, imposed new due diligence measures on the private
sector that weakened privacy and confidentiality laws and increased penalties for non-compliance with regulatory efforts.
74

A.

U.S. Sanctions Against Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations

On September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush issued an executive order that immediately froze U.S. financial assets of, and prohibited
U.S. transactions with, twenty-seven different entities. 75 The listed entities
included terrorist organizations, individual terrorist leaders, a corporation
76
that serves as a front for terrorism and several nonprofit organizations.
77
The executive order was issued under the authority of IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act,7 8 section 5 of the United Nations Participation
Act of 1945, as amended, 79 and 3 U.S.C. § 301. President Bush also cited
as legal bases the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1214 of December 8, 1998, Resolution 1267 of October 15, 1999, Resolution 1333 of
December 19, 2000, and Resolution 1363 of July 30, 2001.80
The Administration believed, as it still does, that many of the targeted
terrorist individuals and groups, such as Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda,
81
operate primarily overseas and have little money in the United States.
As a result, it announced to foreign governments, unwilling to block these
terrorists' ability to access funds in foreign accounts or to share information, that the United States has the authority to freeze a foreign bank's
assets and transactions in the United States. Legally, the executive order
authorizes this action by empowering the Secretary of the Treasury, in
74. This section is derived substantially from Bruce Zagaris, US. Initiates
Sanctions Against bin Laden and Associates, 17 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 480, 480-85
(2001).
75. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786, 790 (2002), reprinted as amended in
50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (2005) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 13,224].
76. Executive Order on Terrorist Financing: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1358 (Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Remarks]
(authorizing financial sanctions against foreign terrorists and their associates).
77. 50 U.S.C. § 1701-1707 (2005).
78. Id. § 1601 (2005).
79. 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2005).
80. Exec. Order No. 13,224, supra note 75, at 786.
81. Id. at 789-90 (recounting patterns of terrorist activity identified by State
Department as threats). See Remarks, supra note 76 (declaring imminent threat by
people from foreign countries).
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consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to take
82
whatever action may be necessary or appropriate.
The following persons are subject to the blocking order: (1) foreign
persons determined by the Secretary of State to have committed, or to
pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the
security of the United States, its foreign policy, economy or citizens; (2)
persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of any persons listed under the order
or any other persons determined to be subject to it; (3) persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to assist in, sponsor or provide
financial, material or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, such acts of terrorism or those persons listed
under the order or determined to be subject to it; (4) persons determined
by the Secretary of the Treasury to be otherwise associated with those per83
sons listed under the order or determined to be subject to it.
The executive order's other principal prohibitions include: (1) transacting or dealing in blocked property either by U.S. entities (including
overseas branches, but not foreign subsidiaries) or within the United
States; (2) for American entities and those in the United States only, evading or avoiding, or attempting to evade or avoid, any of the order's
prohibitions; (3) conspiring to violate any of the order's prohibitions; and
(4) making donations intended to relieve human suffering to persons
84
listed under the order or determined to be subject to it.
Practically speaking, the terrorist sanctions introduced by Executive
Order 13,224 largely overlapped then-existing U.S. terrorist sanctions administered by the Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, i.e., the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations 8 5 and the Foreign Terrorist
Organizations Sanctions Regulations. 86 Under the Terrorism Sanctions
Regulations, the Office blocks the property of persons posing a significant
risk of disrupting the Middle East peace process. Under the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, U.S. financial institutions must
block all funds in which foreign terrorist organizations have an interest.
Most of the persons listed in the executive order were already listed as
Specially Designated Global Terrorists under the Terrorism Sanctions
Regulations or as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the Foreign Ter87
rorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations.
82. Exec. Order No. 13,224, supra note 75, at 787.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 787-88. The last prohibition only applies to donations made by U.S.
nationals. Id.
85. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg 5079 (Jan. 25, 1995), reprinted as
amended in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2003).
86. 31 C.F.R. § 597 (2001), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2003).
87. For a complete and current list of individuals and organizations subject to
blocking orders promulgated under the authority of Executive Order 13,224, the
Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, the Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regu-

lations and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, see Office
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The newer sanctions also significantly expanded on existing ones.
First, they are broader than the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations because
their reach extends beyond terrorists that pose a significant risk of disrupting the Middle East peace process. Second, and most importantly, the
sanctions are broader than the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions
Regulations in that they require blocking actions by all U.S. entities, not
just financial institutions. Third, the new sanctions make it easier to designate more individuals as terrorists because anyone "associated" with terrorists can be listed. Now, the U.S. government will block the U.S. assets
of and bar U.S. market access to foreign banks that can be linked to terrorists in any way, unless they agree to freeze those terrorists' assets. While
foreign subsidiaries appear to be beyond the scope of the executive order,
any link between them and a terrorist could be treated as an "association"
warranting sanction.
B.

88
New U.S. Investigative Teams Targeting Terrorist FinancialNetworks

Creating lists of terrorists is not enough to establish a working CTFE
regime; however, the proper infrastructure to undertake this work successfully is also necessary. To that end, the United States has established new
intra- and interagency groups, such as the Policy Coordinating Committee
on Terrorist Financing and Operation Green Quest, to prioritize the identification of terrorists and the blocking of their finances8 9 To organize
the high-level effort against terrorist financing, the National Security
Council established the Policy Coordinating Committee on Terrorist Financing soon after the attacks of September 11,.2001. Its purpose is to vet,
to terrorist fiapprove and recommend proposed strategic policy relating
90
direction.
that
in
efforts
U.S.
coordinate
to
and
nancing
In October 2001, the U.S. Treasury Department created a new investigative team to target terrorist organizations fronting as legitimate businesses and organizations. Operation Green Quest includes prosecutors
from the Justice Department as well as investigators from the Internal Revof Foreign Assets Control, What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions, at http://
www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sanctions/terrorism.html (last visited Jan. 31,

2005) [hereinafter OFAC List].
88. This section is derived substantially from Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Forms New
Investigative Team to Target Terrorist Financial Networks, 17 INrr'L ENFORCEMErr L.
REP. 519, 519-20 (2001).
89. See, e.g., U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,' and Urban Affairs:
"CounterterrorInitiatives in the TerrorFinanceProgram",108th Cong. 3-5 (2003) (statement of David Aufhauser, General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Treasury) [hereinafter
Aufhauserl (highlighting nuances with which U.S. government officials can operate to cease "financial pipeline" of terrorism around world); FinancialWar on Terrorism: New Money Trails Present Fresh Challenges: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 107th Cong. 8-9 (2002) (statement of Alan Larson, Under Sec'y for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, Dep't of State) (outlining "global strategy" that includes multilaterlism with national and international support).
90. See Aufhauser, supra note 89, at 5 (outlining establishment of committee
by National Security Council after terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001).
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enue Service, the Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and other agencies. 9 1 By taking a systems-oriented approach, the group
tackles terrorist financing in a different manner from other similar agencies. 9 2 It is intended to be proactive by identifying future sources of terrorist financing and dismantling their activities before they can take
root. 93 Thus, it has targeted activities that have been connected with terrorist financing, such as counterfeiting, credit card fraud, drug trafficking
and cash smuggling, as well as illicit charities and financial institutions and
hawalas-the undocumented asset transfers common in the Middle East
94
and Asia.
The FBI has also established its own CTFE agency: the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. TFOS participates on the Policy Coordinating Committee on
Terrorism Financing and serves as a mini-version of that body within the
FBI. 95 It also provides intelligence and investigative support to field offices, other agencies and foreign governments. 96 TFOS's work has led to
many successful law enforcement actions. With the assistance of foreign
authorities, TFOS disrupted Al Qaeda financing in the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia. 9 7 In the United States, TFOS
efforts have resulted in the dismantling of a Hezbollah procurement and
fund-raising network tied to cigarette smuggling and a charity that was
sending money to Al Qaeda. 98
The establishment of the task forces illustrates the depth of the
United States' commitment to CTFE and its dedication to combining the
many areas of expertise of various agencies to maximize success. The government is training investigators to think in new ways, develop international relationships and cooperate with the private sector. Nevertheless,
these efforts face a daunting infrastructural challenge. The enormous reorganization of the U.S. government, necessary after the establishment of
the Department of Homeland Security, has led to turf wars, funding staff91. See Peter Spiegel, US Team Created to Target al-Qaeda Finances, FIN.

TIMES,

Oct. 26, 2001, at 5 (detailing participation of various government agencies).
92. See Financial War on Terrorism: New Money Trails Present Fresh Challenges:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 107th Cong. 10 (2002) (statement of
Jimmy Gurul, Under Sec'y for Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Treasury) [hereinafter
Gurul6] (discussing magnitude of terrorist financial support).
93. See Spiegel, supra note 91 (underscoring predictive methods by which
agencies work in tandem to prevent future terrorist attacks).
94. See id. (describing specific targets of current agency activity).
95. See U.S. Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs: "Counterterror Initiatives in the Terror FinanceProgram", 108th Cong. 2-3 (2003) (statement of
John S. Pistole, Assistant Dir., Counterterrorism Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigation)
(expressing desire for "incremental" weathering of terrorist assets).
96. See id. at 4-5 (discussing multi-national investigations of terrorist financing
spearheaded by TFOS).
97. See id. at 5 (citing successful operations within certain countries in context
of increased cooperation with entities within private sector).
98. See id. at 12 (highlighting investigative assistance offered by TFOS).
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ing problems and demoralization.9 " It is hoped that the new Executive
Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes within the Department of the Treasury can successfully lead U.S. AML/CTFE efforts during
the transition period and beyond. 10 0
C.

The USA PATRIOT Act1 0 1

On October 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law the
USA PATRIOT Act. 10 2 Title III of the Act, concerning efforts designed to
combat international money laundering and terrorism financing, greatly
strengthened the CTFE regime and even more fully incorporated AML
schemes through enhanced due diligence requirements.
103
It
Section 311 of the Act added a new section, 5318A, to the BSA.
gives the Secretary of the Treasury discretionary authority to impose one
or more of five special measures on foreign jurisdictions or their institutions, foreign financial institutions or one or more types of accounts, if the
Secretary determines that the entity poses a "primary money laundering
concern" to the United States. The special measures include: (1) requiring additional record-keeping or reporting for particular transactions; (2)
requiring identification of the foreign beneficial owners of certain accounts at a U.S. financial institution; (3) requiring identification of customers of a foreign bank who use an interbank payable-through account
opened by a foreign bank at a U.S. bank; (4) requiring the identification
of customers of a foreign bank who use certain correspondent accounts
opened by that foreign bank at a U.S. bank; and (5) restricting or prohibiting the establishment or maintenance of certain interbank correspondent or payable-through accounts, after consultation with the Secretary of
State, the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board.' 0 4 Measures (1) through (4) cannot be imposed for more than
120 days except by regulation, and measure (5) may only be imposed by
regulation.
99. SeeJohn Mintz, Government's Hobbled Giant; Homeland Security is Struggling,
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2003, at Al (discussing problems plaguing Department of
Homeland Security).
100. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, U.S. Treasury Department Announces New Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, (Mar.
3, 2003) (announcing formation and explaining duties of Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes).
101. This section is derived substantially from Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Enacts
Counterterrorism Act with Significant New International Provisions, 17 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 522, 522-25 (2001).
102. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49 and
50 U.S.C.).
103. See id. § 311, 115 Stat. at 298 (introducing amendments to existing law).
104. See id. § 311, 115 Stat. at 300-04 (detailing specific discretionary measures
afforded Secretary of Treasury).
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Section 313 added subsection (j) to 31 U.S.C. § 5318 to prohibit depository institutions and securities brokers and dealers operating in the
United States from establishing, maintaining, administering or managing
correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks, other than shell bank ve10 5
hicles affiliated with recognized and regulated depository institutions.
On December 14, 2002, final rules were issued on obtaining certain infor10 6
mation with respect to correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks.
As evidence that terrorist supporters use shell banks and correspondent
accounts to collect and move money, Treasury cited its November 7, 2001
listing of Bank al-Taqwa, a Bahamian-based shell bank, as a terrorist fi10 7
nancing source.
Pursuant to section 314, the Secretary of the Treasury issued regulations on September 26, 2002, to encourage cooperation among financial
institutions, financial regulators and law enforcement officials and to permit the sharing of information by law enforcement and regulatory authorities with those institutions regarding persons reasonably suspected, on the
basis of credible evidence, of engaging in terrorist acts or money laundering activities. 10 8 The section also allows (with notice to the Secretary of
the Treasury) the sharing among banks of information regarding possible
terrorist or money laundering activity and requires the Secretary of the
Treasury to publish a semi-annual report containing a detailed analysis of
patterns of suspicious activity and other appropriate investigative insights
derived from suspicious activity reports (SARs) and law enforcement investigations. The reports provide guidance to the financial industry on the
utility and patterns of filings SARs and the government use of the same.
These provisions give financial institutions and their employees a "qualified" safe harbor protection from liability when they provide information
to another institution about a former employee's employment record.' 0 9
On March 16, 2005, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which was instrumental in shaping the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, proposed a more robust use of Section 314(b) when financial
institutions are trying to trace transactions in connection with internal
investigations.
105. See id. § 313, 115 Stat. 306-07 (noting restrictions on brokerage firms
with exception to some firms that are already subject to U.S. government

agencies).
106. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 103 (2002).
107. PATRIOT Act Oversight: InvestigatingPatterns of Terrorist Financing:Hearing
Before the House Financial Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 108th Cong. 10

(2002) (statement ofJuan C. Zarate, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Terrorism and Violent
Crime, U.S. Dep't of Treasury).
108. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.100, 103.110 (2002) (encouraging interdependence
among government agencies).
109. See Robert B. Serino, Money Laundering, Terrorism, & Fraud,ABA BANK
22, 24 (Mar./Apr. 2002) (explaining allowances of disclosure between
two institutions hiring same, suspect individual).
COMPLIANCE
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The Treasury Department significantly expanded the role of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), an information conduit
between law enforcement and financial institutions.' 10 To obtain customer account information, federal law enforcement agencies merely had
to submit a form to FinCEN that required them only to identify the agency
and certify that the information pertained to a case concerning money
laundering or terrorism.'1 1 After it received the form, FinCEN would ask
financial institutions and businesses to supply information on the relevant
1 12
accounts or transactions.
The system, however, proved problematic initially. Financial institutions received many information requests per day, often addressed to the
wrong person with only a week to respond. 1 3 In response to complaints
from the American Bankers Association, 114 FinCEN stopped all such information requests from U.S. law enforcement agencies for four months in
order to retool the system to give financial institutions more time and to
solve other problems. 115 Since then, the system has been used to share
the names of over 250 persons suspected of terrorist financing and has
resulted in over 1,700 matches, 700 tips and 500 case referrals that were
passed on to law enforcement officials.1 16 In addition, under its new
110. See Financial Mgmt. Serv., U.S. Dep't Treasury, Strategic Plan for Fiscal
Years 2003-2008 15-16 (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://fms.treas.gov/strategic
plan/strat-plan_2003.pdf (stressing analytical idea sharing among network members despite certain "external factors" that may modify FinCEN outlook). Treasury
has also promised to provide the financial sector with more information, such as
typologies of money laundering or terrorist financing schemes and updates on the
latest criminal trends. SeeJimmy Gurul6, Under Sec'y for Enforcement, Dep't of
Treasury, Speech Before the American Bankers' Association Money Laundering
Conference (Oct. 22, 2001), available at http://www.tres.gov/press/releases/po
707.htm ("At every stage of our efforts, we must work in close partnership with
other government agencies, the private sector, and our global partners to achieve
success.").
111. To Relief of Many, U.S. Treasury Halts Flood of '314(a)' Requests, 14 MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT 1 (Dec. 2002) (noting ease of obtaining customer account
information).
112. See id. (describing procedural methods used by Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)).
113. Progress Since 9/11: The Effectiveness of U.S. Anti-Terrorist FinancingEfforts:
Hearing Before the House Fin. Serus. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, 108th
Cong. 5 (2003) (statement ofJohnJ. Byrne on behalf of American Bankers Association) (drawing attention to failures of communicative paths between businesses
and financial institutions).
114. Letter from John J. Byrne, Senior Counsel and Compliance Manager,
American Bankers Association, to Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Special
Information Sharing (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonly
res / CDA74BEE-3E41-42D4-B7EO-C32E94B32D07 / 21554 / USAPatriotsec3l4com
mentletter92.pdf.
115. See Press Release, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN to
Reinstate USA PATRIOT Act Section 314(a) Information Requests (Feb. 6, 2003),
available at http://www.fincen.gov/314a-pressrelease02O62003.pdf (describing revisions to FinCEN procedural methods for information sharing).
116. Aufhauser, supra note 89, at 8-9, 11.
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CTFE powers, FinCEN has supported over 2,600 terrorism investigations
and the expansion of the suspicious activity report regime has resulted in
financial institutions filing over 2,600 such reports on possible terrorist
117
financing.
Several sections of the USA PATRIOT Act broadened the reach of law
enforcement and the judiciary. Section 315 amended 18 U.S.C. § 1956 to
add foreign criminal offenses and certain U.S. export control violations,
customs, firearm, computer and other offenses to the list of crimes that
are "specified unlawful activities" for purposes of the criminal money laundering provisions. The broadening of predicate offenses for criminalizing
money laundering enabled U.S. prosecutors to help foreign law enforcement agencies who might otherwise have difficulty prosecuting someone
or seizing funds outside their country. 118
Section 317 gave U.S. courts extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign
persons committing money-laundering offenses in the U.S., foreign banks
opening bank accounts and foreign persons who convert assets ordered
forfeited by a U.S. court. It also permits a U.S. court dealing with such
foreign persons to issue a pre-trial restraining order or take other action
necessary to preserve property in the United States to satisfy an ultimate
judgment. In addition, section 318 expands the definition of financial institution for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 to include those operating outside of the United States.
Section 319 amended U.S. asset forfeiture law' 19 to treat funds deposited by foreign banks in interbank accounts with U.S. banks as having been
deposited in the United States for purposes of the forfeiture rules. 120 The
terrorist, but not the bank, can oppose the forfeiture action. 121 The Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury are authorized to issue a sum-

117. See id. at 11 (discussing banking institution responsibilities as analyzing
of banking patterns and cooperating with federal law enforcement officials).
118. Dismantlingthe FinancialInfrastructureof Terrorism:HearingBefore the House

Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 7 (2001) (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Att'y Gen., Crim. Div., U.S. Dep't ofJustice) (illustrating international cooperativity through discussion of investigation of suspected Hizballah member in North
Carolina).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2001).
120. See United States v. All Funds in Account Nos. 747.034/278, 747.009/278, &
747.714/278 Banco Espanol de Credito, Spain, 295 F.3d 23, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (up-

holding jurisdiction of U.S. courts to order forfeiture of property located in foreign countries); see also The Financial War on Terrorism & the Administration's
Implementation of the Anti-Money LaunderingProvisionsof the USA PATRIOT Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 7
(2002) (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Att'y Gen., Crim. Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice) (describing case of Belizean money launderers whose assets became
recoverable by Act).
121. See id. at 14 (asserting that banks lack standing to challenge forfeiture
action).
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records, wherever
mons or subpoena to any such foreign bank and to seek
122
account.
correspondent
a
such
to
relate
located, that
Section 325 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations concerning the maintenance of concentration accounts by U.S. depository institutions, in order to ensure such accounts are not used to
prevent association of the identity of an individual customer with the
movement of funds of which the customer is the direct or beneficial
owner. 123 Similarly, pursuant to section 326, the Secretary of the Treasury
promulgated final rules establishing minimum standards for financial institutions and their customers regarding the identity of customers who
open new accounts. 124 The standards require financial institutions to verify customers' identities, consult with lists of known and suspected ter125
rorists at account openings and maintain records.
Section 373 of the Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 1960 to prohibit unlicensed money services businesses. In addition, such businesses must file
suspicious activity reports with law enforcement officials. 126 Pursuant to
section 356, the Secretary of the Treasury promulgated final rules requiring broker-dealers to also file suspicious activity reports. 12 7 In the future,
the Treasury Department will issue similar regulations regarding other financial institutions, including futures commission merchants, commodity
trading advisors, commodity pool operators and investment companies.
III.

THE WORK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have played a key role in
conceptualizing and creating the international financial enforcement regimes through conventions, resolutions and recommendations. 12 By establishing standards, mechanisms and institutions to deal with the acutely
transnational problems of transnational corruption, international narcotics control, transnational organized crime, economic sanctions, money
laundering and terrorist financing, they set the framework for the neces122. In relation to forfeiture, section 320 amended 18 U.S.C. section 981 to
allow the United States to institute forfeiture proceedings against any proceeds of
foreign predicate offenses located in the U.S. Section 323 allowed the government
to seek a restraining order to preserve the availability of property subject to a foreign forfeiture confiscation judgment.
123. Treasury has not yet issued any such regulations.
124. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2003) (requiring banks to implement "Customer
Identification Program").
125. See id. (stating requirements of "Customer Identification Program").
126. See id. § 103.20 (stating requirements of reports by money services
businesses).
127. See id. § 103.19 (stating requirements of reports by brokers or dealers in
securities).
128. For background on the work of international organizations in the AML
realm, see WwiuALM C. GimoRE, DIRTY MONEY: THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING COUNTERMivAsuREs

51-152 (3d ed. 2004) (detailing efforts of United Na-

tions and Financial Action Task Force in combating money laundering).
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sary international cooperation. Although these standards have traditionally been comprised of "soft law," in recent years, IGOs have started to
impose compliance regimes through evaluation mechanisms, "naming
and shaming" and economic sanctions.
In particular, the aforementioned almost simultaneous issuance of
blacklists in 2000 against non-cooperative countries and territories was an
attempt to jumpstart the merging of the AML and CTFE regimes, conferring on soft laws a greater status in international law and politics.
But because international financial enforcement laws have developed
at such a rapid rate, there are inconsistencies in legislation, implementation and enforcement that present difficulties for international cooperation. Further, legal systems differ in their organization, procedures,
substantive law and cultural traditions. A nation with an Islamic legal system and another rooted in the common law may have difficulty bridging
differences in their concepts of the proper procedures and ultimate goals.
Reaching an understanding on these issues can also be extremely difficult
because privacy laws, confidentiality laws, AML statutes and asset forfeiture
statutes often encompass competing societal objectives.
As IGOs continue to strive for uniform legislation governing the international financial enforcement regime many of the gaps and obstacles
that arise from conflicts of laws will be resolved. Major problems remain
in resources and political will to carry out the transformations of law in
international financial enforcement. This will take time, however, because
the normal course for creating international legal norms has been to
agree initially on narrow sets of legal principles and policies, and then to
broaden them. Already, cooperation has increased substantially, especially in Western Europe and to a lesser extent the Western Hemisphere,
among regional groups that share similar institutions and legal systems
and that interact within a common criminal justice organization. Indeed,
the efforts of IGOs such as the United Nations, the OECD, the Council of
Europe, European Union (E.U.) and the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering have been largely responsible for the international acceptance of the AML/CTFE regime.
A.

Narcotics Control

The U.N. pioneered the 1988 Vienna Convention against the Trafficking in Illegal Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances, which contains
the requirements to criminalize money laundering and immobilize the assets of persons involved in illegal narcotics trafficking. The U.N. Office on
Drugs and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP) provides technical assistance
on legislative drafting, financial intelligence, capacity building and a range
of services to help governments and law enforcement agencies implement
their obligations under the U.N. Vienna Drug Convention and related
anti-money laundering initiatives. The U.N. has also developed a countermoney laundering initiative against offshore financial centers. The
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UNODCCP has provided model laws on laundering, confiscation and international cooperation. 129 The U.N. International Drug Control Program has issued a Model Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime
Bill. 130
On October 25, 2001, the UNODCCP received commitments from
thirty-one offshore financial centers to participate in the U.N.'s global program to develop financial regulation to combat money laundering that
fulfills internationally accepted standards. The U.N. is working with regional FATF-style bodies and other international organizations in this
initiative.
B.

Organized Crime

On December 15, 2000, 124 countries signed the United Nations
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime during a four-day highlevel signing conference in Palermo, Italy.' 3 1 The Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, concluded at the Tenth session of the Ad
Hoc Committee established by the General Assembly to deal with this
problem, is a legally binding instrument committing States that ratify it to
taking a series of measures against transnational organized crime. These
measures include the creation of domestic criminal offenses to combat
organized crime, the adoption of new sweeping frameworks for mutual
legal assistance, extradition, law enforcement cooperation and technical
assistance and training.
At a ceremony on December 12, 2000, the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (TOCC) and its original two protocols, one to
prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and
children, and the other against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and
air, were opened for signature. There are currently ninety-four parties to
the TOCC and 147 signatories; it entered into force on September 29,
2003.132
129. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Programme Against Money
Laundering,Model Legislation on Laundering Confiscation and InternationalCooperation
in Relation to the Proceeds of Crime (1999), available at http://www.imolin.org/
imolin/ml99eng.html [hereinafter Global Programme Against Money Laundering].
130. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Model Money Laundering,Proceeds of
Crime and Terrorist FinancingBill 2003 (2003), available at http://www.imolin.org/
imolin/poctf03.html [hereinafter Model Money Laundering].
131. See Press Release, United Nations, More Than 120 Nations Sign New
U.N. Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, As High-Level Meeting Concludes in Palermo (Dec. 15, 2000), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/
unis/pressrels/2000/cp392.html; see also Alessandra Stanley, Palermo Shows Off as a
Cleaned-Up Mafia Capital N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at A3 (providing additional
background information on Palermo meeting).
132. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Signatories to the UN Convention
Against Transnational Crime and Its Protocol, available at http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/crime_cicpsignatures.html (describing adoption of Convention) [hereinafter Signatories].
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The TOCC1

The Convention seeks to strengthen the power of governments in
combating serious crimes. The new treaty will provide the basis for
stronger common action against money-laundering, greater ease of extradition, measures on the protection of witnesses and enhanced judicial cooperation. It will also create a funding mechanism to assist countries in
implementing the Convention. The Convention aims to help countries
synchronize their national laws, so that no uncertainty will exist as to
34
whether a crime in one country is also a crime in another.
Signatory countries undertake the following commitments in the
TOCC: (1) to "criminalize offenses committed by organized crime groups,
including corruption and corporate or company offenses;" (2) to combat
"money-laundering and the proceeds of crime;" (3) to accelerate and extend the scope of extradition; (4) to "protect[ ] witnesses testifying against
criminal groups;" (5) to strengthen cooperation to locate and prosecute
suspects; (6) to enhance prevention of organized crime at the national
and international levels; and (7) to "develop[ ] a series of protocols containing measures to combat specific acts of transnational organized
35
crime."'1
The provisions of the instruments can also be divided into seven general categories: definitions, requirements to criminalize, domestic measures to combat organized crime activities, international cooperation
obligations, training and technical assistance, prevention, technical and
other provisions.
a.

Definitions

The initial Articles of each of the instruments define the important
terms, provide for the elements of offenses that must be established pursuant to the instruments and determine the circumstances in which the provisions of the respective instruments will apply. 136 The definitions will
serve to standardize terminology among countries that act against transnational organized crime.
b.

Requirements to Criminalize

The TOCC creates four specific crimes to combat areas of crime that
are commonly used in support of transnational organized crime activities:
(1) participation in the activities of an "organized criminal group" and
133. See Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25,

U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (2000) [hereinafter TOCC].

134. See id.
135. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, After Palermo: An Overview of What the
Convention and Protocols Hope to Accomplish, available at http://www.odccp.org/pa-

lermo/suml.html (last visited June 12, 2005).
136. See TOCC, supra note 133, at 4, 32, 41 (providing "Use of terms" for each
section of Convention).
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"organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counseling" serious
crimes involving organized criminal groups (Art. 5); (2) money laundering (Art. 6); (3) corruption where a link exists to transnational organized
crime (Art. 8); and (4) obstruction ofjustice, including the use of corrupt
(e.g., bribery) or coercive means (physical force, threats or intimidation)
to influence testimony, other evidence or the actions of any law enforcement or other justice official (Art. 23).137 In addition, the Protocols create additional crimes that deal with their basic subject matter (e.g.,
trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, smuggling of illicit manufacture of firearms).1 38 Most countries will punish these crimes by four years
or more and will hence come within the Convention as "serious crimes."
The Protocols also create more minor offenses (e.g., falsification of travel
documents, defacement of firearm serial numbers) that support their basic policy goals. The Convention only applies to these offenses where the
Protocol so provides. Countries that ratify the instruments must enact legislation making these activities domestic offenses if such laws do not already exist.
c.

Domestic Measures to Combat Organized Crime Activities

Signatories must adopt domestic laws and practices that would prevent or suppress certain types of organized crime-related activities. 139 For
example, to combat money laundering, signatories must require their
banks to maintain accurate records and have them available for inspection
by domestic law enforcement officials. 140 Signatories cannot allow anonymous bank accounts and bank secrecy cannot be used to shield criminal
activities. 14 1 Additional domestic offenses, such as failing to keep or produce bank records, must be established to support these measures. Trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants will be combated by the
relevant Protocols that contain minimum standards for the manufacture,
issuance and verification of passports and other international travel docu137. See id. at 5-6, 8, 21 (stating that each "state party" shall adopt laws
criminalizing such offenses as defined by Convention).
138. See id. at 33, 42 (requiring criminalization of "trafficking in persons" and
"smuggling of migrants"). A third Protocol, adopted later and not attached to the
original document containing the Convention and first two Protocols, addresses
issues surrounding firearms. See ProtocolAgainst the Illicit Manufacturingof and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Part and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the
United Nations Convention Against TransnationalOrganized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/255,
U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., at 4-5 U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/255 (2001) (requiring
criminalization of illicit manufacturing or trafficking of firearms) [hereinafter Firearms Protocol].
139. SeeTOCC, supranote 133, at 6 (requiring countries to criminalize money
laundering).
140. See id. at 7 (requiring countries to adopt "comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime").
141. See id. at 7 (stating that regulatory "regime shall emphasize requirements
for customer identification, record-keeping and the reporting of suspicious
transactions").
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ments. 142 While some of the measures are mandatory, others have greater
14 3
flexibility as to whether states will implement a measure and, if so, how.
d.

International Cooperation Obligations

To facilitate the necessary international cooperation against transnational organized crime, signatories have agreed to assist one another in
dealing with transnational organized crime as a general problem, and to
assist in dealing with specific cases. Cooperation under the TOCC includes mutual legal assistance and extradition (Arts. 16 and 18) and other
specific measures, such as law enforcement cooperation and collection
and exchange of information. 144 While these provisions are similar to
traditional provisions already in place in many regional or bilateral agreements, the large number of countries expected to ratify the Convention
will facilitate much broader legal assistance and extradition than presently
exists. These provisions are intended to set minimum standards only. Signatories are encouraged to extend cooperation in bilateral or regional arrangements. A requested State may also not refuse assistance because of
bank secrecy (Art. 18(8)) 14 5 or because the alleged offense also involves
"fiscal matters" (Art. 18(22)).146
The Convention also provides the general basis to conductjoint investigations (Art. 19),147 cooperate in special investigative procedures, such
as electronic surveillance and general law-enforcement cooperation (Arts.
20 and 27).148 The Protocols supplement these provisions in some areas.
The Protocols provide for additional, more specific types of cooperation,
such as assistance with the tracing of firearms, or assistance with the identification of nationals who are found in other countries as smuggling mi149
grants, trafficked persons or organized crime offenders.
e.

Training and Technical Assistance

Several Articles require signatories to maintain national expertise in
dealing with transnational organized crime problems that require ade142. See id. at 46 (requiring states to ensure travel documents are not easily
forged).
143. Compare id. at 7 (stating that each state party "shall institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks.... ."), with id. at 10
("State Parties may consider the possibility of requiring that an offender demonstrate the lawful origin of alleged proceeds of crime . . . ").
144. See id. at 15-20 (stating agreement on mutual legal assistance).
145. See id. at 16.
146. See id. at 19.
147. See id. at 20 (encouraging formation of bilateral or multilateral agreements or agreements on case-by-case basis to establish "joint investigative bodies").
148. See id. at 20, 23-24 (requiring states to take such measures permitted by
domestic law).
149. See id. at 35-36 (implementing specific measures for exchanging information regarding trafficking in persons).
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quate training facilities. 150 Due to resource limitations of developing
countries, the Convention and Protocols provide for technical assistance
projects in which developed countries would help with technical expertise,
resources or both. For instance, Article 30(2) (b) requires signatories to
strengthen "financial and material assistance to support the efforts of developing countries" to combat transnational organized crime and to implement the Convention.- 5 Article 30(2)(c) requires "adequate and
regular voluntary contributions to an account specifically designated for
that purpose in a United Nations funding mechanism" to support such
efforts. 1 52 Articles 14(3) and 30(2) (c) call for signatories to give "special
consideration" to the use of confiscated proceeds of crime for this pur3
pose, subject to domestic legal restrictions.15 According to paragraph
nine of the draft resolution, the General Assembly is to adopt the Convention and operate a designated account mentioned in Article 30 within the
U.N. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund.15 4 Article 30 also encourages signatories to start contributions immediately, in order155to help
developing countries to prepare implementing the Convention.
f. Prevention
Article 31 of the TOCC and Protocols require signatories to adopt
measures to prevent various types of transnational organized crime. These
measures include the taking of security precautions, training of officials,
maintaining general records about crime and specific records to control
key activities, such as the import/export of firearms and the issuing and
156
verification of travel documents.
g.

Technical and Other Provisions

The concluding provisions of each instrument provide for technical
and procedural matters such as the procedures for signing, ratification
and coming into force. 157 Pursuant to Article 36(1), the TOCC opened at
a signing ceremony at Palermo, Italy on December 12-15, 2000 and thereafter at the U.N. Headquarters in New York until December 12, 2002.158
Instruments certifying the ratification by signatories will be filed thereafter
at U.N. Headquarters, and the Convention enters into force on the nineti150. See id. at 24-25 (providing that each state shall "initiate, develop or improve specific training programmes for its law enforcement personnel").
151. Id. at 25.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 12, 25-26.
154. See id. at 3 (encouraging member states to contribute to account).
155. See id. at 25-26 (calling for states to make "adequate and regular volun-

tary contributions")
156.
157.
ceptance
158.

See id. at 26-27 (listing measures states are required to take).
See id. at 29, 38, 49 (providing details about "signature, ratification, acand accession").
See id. at 29 (providing times Convention shall be open to sign).
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eth day after the day on which the fortieth such ratification is filed (Arts.
36(3) and 38).159 As mentioned, the Convention entered into force on
September 29, 2003.
2.

Protocols

a.

160
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons

The Protocol is to "prevent and combat" trafficking in persons and
facilitate international cooperation against such trafficking. It criminalizes
and requires control and cooperation measures against traffickers and
provides for assistance to protect and assist the victims. "Trafficking in
persons" is intended to include a range of cases where organized crime is
exploiting human beings and there exists duress and a transnational aspect, such as the movement of people across borders or their exploitation
within a country by a transnational organized crime group. Drafters have
had difficulty in including the wide range of coercive means used by organized crime (e.g., abduction, force, fraud, deception or coercion) and
distinguishing between consensual acts or treatment. The Protocol has
seventy-six parties and 117 signatories and entered into force on December 25, 2003.161

b.

62
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea'

The Protocol is to combat smuggling by prevention, investigation and
prosecution of offenses, and by promoting international cooperation
among the signatories. Signatories must strengthen their national legislation to criminalize and prosecute certain crimes, open information channels and promote international law enforcement cooperation. The
Protocol will also safeguard the human rights and other interests of smuggled migrants by promoting international cooperation for that purpose. It
163
will only deal with activities involving an "organized criminal group."
State Parties must criminalize the smuggling of migrants, which includes
the procurement of either illegal entry or illegal residence in order to
obtain any financial or other benefit, whether direct or indirect (Art.
6). 164 Signatories must criminalize the procurement, provision, possession or production of a fraudulent travel or identity document where this
occurred for the purpose of smuggling migrants (Art. 6).165 The Protocol
159. See id. at 29-30 (calling for instruments of ratifications to be deposited
with Secretary General).
160. See generally id. at 31-39 (providing text of Protocol and supplementing
TOCC).
161. See Signatories,supra note 132 (stating status of Protocol).
162. See generally TOCC, supra note 133, at 40-48 (providing text of Protocol
supplementing TOCC).
163. See id. at 42 (stating scope of application of Protocol).
164. See id. at 42-43 (stating requirements of states to criminalize certain
offenses).
165. See id. at 42.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005

33

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: p. 509

is not intended to criminalize migration itself; it provides that migrants
should not be liable to prosecution for a Protocol offense "for the fact of
having been [smuggled]," but does not exclude liability for the smuggling
of others or other offenses, even where the accused is also a migrant him
16 6
or herself.
Part II gives states that encounter ships that are smuggling, or believed to be smuggling migrants, adequate authority to arrest the migrants
and smugglers and to preserve evidence while respecting the sovereignty
of the states, if any, to which the ships are flagged or registered. 16 7 These
provisions emulate the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), the
U.N. Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) and interim measures prepared by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The Protocol has sixty-four parties
and 112 signatories. It entered into force on January 28, 2004.168
c.

Protocol Against Illicit Manufacturing of or Trafficking in
169
Firearms

The Protocol is to combat the illicit transfer of firearms from one
country to another. Signatories must: (1) pass new laws to eradicate the
illegal manufacturing of firearms, tracking existing illicit weapons and
prosecuting offenders; (2) cooperate to prevent, combat and eliminate
the illegal manufacturing and trafficking of firearms; (3) tighten controls
on the export and import of firearms; and (4) exchange information
1 70
about illicit firearms.
To bridge gaps in import/export controls on transporting firearms,
signatories must adopt new controls, including: (1) establishing an effective system for the export, import and international transit licensing of
firearms; (2) confirming that firearms are licensed or authorized by importing countries before granting export licenses; (3) denying the transit,
re-export, re-transfer or trans-shipment of firearms to any destination without written approval from the exporting country and licenses from receiving countries; and (4) strengthening controls at export points for
17 1

firearms.
The Protocol requires international cooperation to combat illicit

manufacturing or smuggling, such as cooperation with the tracing of firearms (Art. 12(4)), the sharing of information about offenders and their
166.
167.
grants by
168.

Id.
See id. at 43-44 (providing for "[m]easure against the smuggling of misea").
See Signatories, supra note 132 (stating status of Protocol).

169. See generally Firearms Protocol, supra note 138 (providing text of Protocol

supplementing TOCC).
170. See id. at 4, 6, 7 (listing requirements that states criminalize certain offenses, maintain export and import controls and exchange information on such
offenses).
171. See id. at 6-7 (providing guidelines for export and import controls).
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methods (Art. 12(2)) and more general scientific or forensic matters related to firearms (Art. 12(3)). Specific bilateral or regional cooperation
agreements are encouraged (Art. 13) and more general forms of mutual
legal assistance and investigative cooperation are covered by the relevant
provisions of the Convention itself. The Protocol requires the establishment of a contact body in each State to implement the Protocol and liaison with other countries (Art. 13(2)), exchange of experience and
training (Art. 14) and technical assistance (Art. 16). Signatories must seek
cooperation from manufacturers, dealers, importers, exporters and commercial carriers of firearms (Art. 13(3)).
The Protocol has thirty parties and fifty-two signatories and has not
yet entered into force. Under Article 18, it requires forty parties to deposit
172
their ratification to the Convention before it enters into force.
d.

Relationship Between the Convention and Protocols
Article 37 of the Convention provides that States must ratify the Con-

vention before they can be a party to any of the Protocols. 1 73 Hence, each

Protocol must be read and applied in conjunction with the main Convention. Countries may be a party to the Convention only, but not to a Protocol only. The various articles of all four instruments take into
consideration the relationship. The main Convention has general provisions dealing with such matters as cooperation, technical assistance and
legal assistance. Each Protocol has more specific provisions supplementing and adapting these rules for application to the specific problems associated with trafficking in persons, smuggling migrants and trafficking in
firearms.
Countries involved with cases under one of the Protocols may rely on
the general provisions of the Convention where the offense involved is
established by the Convention or is a "serious crime" as defined by the
Convention and the offense is "transnational in nature and involves an
organized criminal group,"174 or where the offense is established by the
Protocol and the text of the Protocol specifically states that some or all of
the general provisions of the Convention apply.
e.

Summary and Conclusion

The Convention and the three Protocols will help foster a significant
amount of transformation of law in the operation of criminal justice, international cooperation and demands on the private sector. They create a
number of new crimes, provide for harmonized approaches to the crimes
covered and facilitate broad cooperation against these complex crimes.
While they emulate some of the mechanisms used to combat international
172. See Signatories, supra note 132 (stating status of Protocol).
173. See TOCC, supra note 133, at 29-30 (stating also that party to Convention
is not bound by Protocol unless it becomes party to Protocol)
174. See id. at 5 (defining scope of application).
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narcotics trafficking, the scope of action goes well beyond counter drug
activity.
C. Economic Sanctions
Multilateral cooperation in economic sanctions may serve three useful functions: "[increasing] the moral suasion of the sanction[s], ...
help [ing] isolate the target country from the global community psychologically as well as economically and preempt[ing] foreign backlash, thus
minimizing corrosive friction within the alliance." 175 Multilateral cooperation helps overcome the proactive extraterritorial implementation of economic sanctions, a policy that has incurred the wrath of many countries
and caused enormous foreign policy and economic costs. 1 7 6 Among the
major players for cooperation in economic sanctions have been the U.N.
and the E.U.
An example of a multilateral sanctions program that worked was the
U.N. sanctions against Iraq. It was the "longest operating, most comprehensive and most controversial" in U.N. history.17 7 The program had all
kinds of problems. Many analysts and of course the Bush administration,
argued prior to the Iraq war that the sanctions were a failure. The system
of containment that sanctions helped bring, however, actually eroded
Iraqi military capabilities. The sanctions program forced Iraq to accept
inspections and monitoring and even obtained concessions from Iraq on
political issues such as the border dispute with Kuwait. Despite the leakage and corruption in the sale of Iraqi oil, the sanctions program significantly reduced the revenue available to Iraq, prevented the building of
Iraqi defenses after the Persian Gulf War and blocked the import of critical materials and technologies for producing weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) 178
In May 2002, the Security Council approved a "smart" sanctions package, illustrating that the system could continue to contain and deter Saddam Hussein. 179 After the various inspections following the U.S. invasion
in March 2003, the successes became evident. 180 The bogus claims that
Iraq had reconstituted its WMD programs were exposed.18 1 The costs of
the invasion and occupation are continuing to rise. When economic sanctions are unilateral or have little multilateral support, such as the long175. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED:
TORY AND CURRENT POLICY 96 (2d ed. 1990).

His-

176. See BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING
THE HAPHAZARD U.S LEGAL REGIME 252-54 (1988).
177. George A. Lopez & David Cortright, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked, 83
Ara. 90, 91 (July/Aug. 2004).

FOREIGN

178. See id. (discussing impact of sanctions).

179. See id. (arguing that sanctions could contain and deter Saddam).
180. See id. (noting that unfortunately, only after war started, was it realized
that Iraqi military had been "decimated" by "the strategy of containment").
181. See id. (same).
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standing Cuban sanctions, these sanctions are not as effective as the truly
multilateral ones.
1.

InternationalTax Enforcement Cooperation

a.

OECD

In May 1999, the OECD introduced a harmful tax practices initiative
designed to combat tax evasion, level the playing field among sovereigns
in tax policy and facilitate better cooperation in tax matters.1 8 2 The
OECD subsequently published a blacklist of so-called tax havens and
called for the jurisdictions listed to make a commitment to ending their
harmful tax practices.18 3 A country became a tax haven by having two of
the following four elements: (1) no or low taxes; (2) ring-fencing or discrimination in the types of persons eligible for tax preferences (typically
offering incentives to only foreigners); (3) lack of transparency in the operation of the tax laws; and (4) inadequate exchange of tax
84

information.1

The key development in the OECD's plan to eliminate harmful tax
competition (HTC) was the Bush administration's withdrawal of support
for part of the initiative. On May 10, 2001, then U.S. Treasury Secretary
Paul O'Neill clarified the U.S. reservations on the OECD's harmful tax
practices initiative, creating further uncertainty as to the outcome of the
initiative. 185 Former Treasury Secretary O'Neill wrote:
I am troubled by the underlying premise that low tax rates are
somehow suspect and by the notion that any country, or group of
countries, should interfere in any other country's decision about
how to structure its own tax system. I also am concerned about
the potentially unfair treatment of some non-OECD countries.
The United States does not support efforts to dictate to any country what its own tax rates or tax system should be, and will not
participate in any initiative to harmonize world tax systems. The
United States simply has no interest in stifling the competition
182. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
About Harmful Tax Practices,at http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en-2649_33745
1 1 1 1 37427,00.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2005) (discussing OECD's goals in
eradicating harmful international tax practices).
183. See OECD, Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Report to the 2000 Ministerial
Council Meeting and Recommendations by the Committee on Fiscal Matters: Progress in
Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices, 17 (2000), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2005) (listing tax
havens).
184. See id. at 10 n.4 (listing key factors in identifying jurisdictions containing
tax havens).
185. See Rob Nichols, Confronting OECD's Notions on Taxation, WASH. TIMES,
May 10, 2001, A15 (stating position of United States).
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businesses-to

create

Mr. O'Neill did note that although the United States has:
[A] n obligation to enforce our tax laws as written because failing
to do so undermines the confidence of honest taxpaying Americans in the fairness of our tax system. [The country would] not
turn a blind eye toward tax cheating in any form. That means
pursuing those who illegally evade taxes by hiding income in off18 7

shore accounts.

To support his argument, Mr. O'Neill referred toJohn Mathewson's use of
a bank account in the Cayman Islands, in which ninety-five percent of his
customers were U.S. citizens. 188 Mathewson's cooperation enabled the
IRS to obtain tax evasion convictions and collect substantial back taxes
from more than twenty of his clients. 189
During the last week of June 2001, the media announced that the
OECD had reached, in principle, a compromise on its harmful tax practices initiative.' 90 Following the OECD's Fiscal Affairs Committee meeting
June 26-27, the organization refocused its program on the exchange of
banking and financial information with OECD governments and deferred
pressuring jurisdictions identified as tax havens into resetting their tax
rates. The initiative will now require only the thirty-two so-called tax haven
countries to agree to take action on exchange of tax information and
transparency. The deadline of July 31, 2001, at which time those tax
havens failing to make the commitment would be put on the blacklist was
extended until November 30, 2001.
On June 29, 2001, the OECD announced that Aruba was the tenth
jurisdiction to make a commitment to the harmful tax practices principles.
The other jurisdictions that made similar commitments were Bermuda,
the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, the Isle of Man, Malta, Mauritius, the Netherlands Antilles, San Marino and the Seychelles.1 9 1
186. Paul O'Neill, Confronting OECD's Notions on Taxation, WASH. TIMES, May
10, 2001, at A17 (criticizing OECD's harmful tax competition).
187. See id. (suggesting importance of executing U.S. tax laws without extraneous interferences).
188. See id. (giving example of U.S. attempts to eradicate offshore tax havens).
189. See id. (highlighting number of tax evaders prosecuted through one
case). See generally Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Announcement of Partial Withdrawal from
Harmful Tax Initiative Creates Uncertainties, 17 Irr'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 284, 284-

86 (2001) (providing background on U.S partial withdrawal from OECD's harmful
tax policies initiative).
190. See Michael M. Phillips, Accord Is Reached by U.S. and Allies on Tax Havens,
WALL ST. J., June 28, 2001, at A4 (explaining compromise between U.S. and other
members of OECD).
191. See Bruce Zagaris, OECD Reaches Compromise in Principle on Harmful Tax
Practices, 17 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 332, passim (2001) (reporting OECD's
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The OECD harmful tax competition initiative aims to level the playing field in the imposition of taxes and ability to raise revenue. It cited the
erosion of members' tax base by preferential regimes and especially by tax
havens. The OECD defines a tax haven by the existence of two or more of
the following criteria: zero or low tax rates, ring fencing or discrimination.
In November 2000, the OECD released the OECD HTC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which contains a series of obligations that
the targeted "tax haven" jurisdictions were required to undertake if they
were to avoid the blacklist and its attendant sanctions. Major problems
19 2
remain in the proposed obligations set forth in the OECD HTC MOU.
They significantly exceed those called for in the OECD report, Improving
Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes.19 3 This report was designed to

encourage agreement within the OECD on the best way to improve cooperation. The latter report constantly provides alternative options and uses
words such as "encourages" whereas the OECD HTC MOU makes the obligations mandatory without any wiggle room. In fact, the targeted countries would be required to have administrative practices in place to ensure
that the legal mechanism for exchange of information functions effectively and can be monitored, including having personnel responsible for
ensuring that requests for information are answered promptly and efficiently, and that personnel are trained or experienced in obtaining such
information. Ironically, one OECD country, Canada, reserves the right to
decline a request when it lacks sufficient resources to conduct exchanges
of information and hence believes that such exchanges cannot be reciprocal. 194 If Canada believes that such exchanges cannot be reciprocal due to
its shortage of administrative resources, then it is not surprising that the
much smaller targeted countries are also taking the position that such exchange obligations cannot be reciprocal and, similar to the Canadian viewpoint, would want to take a restrictive view of such obligations. The
targeted countries have a more important obligation: the need to protect
195
their economic security and well-being.
In essence, the OECD is signaling that the targeted countries should
respond forthwith to the requests for exchange of information and have
change in focus from pressuring tax havens to increasing intra-organizational exchange of banking information).
192. See OECD, OECD Framework for a Collective Memorandum of Understanding
on Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices, at http://www.tax-news.com/asp/res/

MOUrev20novRl.pdf (last visited on Mar. 10, 2005) (outlining OECD framework
for creation of tax norms).

193. See OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes, 13-19 (Mar. 24, 2000), available at http://www.tax-news.com/
asp/res/bankinfo.pdf (delineating plan to increase data exchange capability).
194. See Steven S. Heller & Boris Stein, InternationalMutual Assistance Through
Exchange of Information, 75 CAHIERS DE DROIT FiscAL INT'L 259, 268 (1990) (noting
limits of obligation to provide assistance).

195. See also RichardJ. Hay, Offshore FinancialCentres: The SupranationalInitiatives, 28 TAX PLANNING INT'L REv. 1 (2001) (discussing problems with exchange of
information), available at http://www.itpa.org/open/archive/richardhay.rff.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005

39

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: p. 509

derided some of the targeted countries for taking too much time responding to requests. The time for response, however, is often to ensure that
the requests are properly concerned with an offense covered by the treaty.
Further, sometimes an interested person may have recourse to a court to
protect their own rights and ensure that the request complies with the
treaty, the constitution and any other applicable provisions.
Some OECD members (i.e., Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland)
have even insisted on covering criminal tax enforcement through a Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaty. Hence, the MOU to the
United States-Luxembourg tax treaty explains that certain information
from financial institutions may be obtained and provided to "certain U.S.
authorities" only in accordance with the proposed United States-Luxembourg MLAT. 196 As a result, the United States delayed the effective19date
7
of the income tax treaty to coincide with the MLAT's taking effect.
The upshot of these and other controversies over exchange of information is that, even if the OECD only proceeds on exchange of tax information, there will be many substantive and procedural policy disputes
concerning achieving a level playing field between the OECD and targeted
countries in the making of policy and its fair implementation. Indeed,
there are just as many controversies involving transparency,' 9 8 but it is
instructive to consider the FATF's counterpart initiative and its privacy and
human rights implications.
On June 3-4, 2004, Germany hosted a meeting of the OECD Global
Forum on Taxation in Berlin. 199 The meeting was convened to further
discuss the process of achieving the objective of a global level playing field
based on high standards of transparency and effective exchange of information in tax matters. 20 0 The meeting brought together over 100 representatives from forty-two governments, both OECD and non-OECD, that
are committed to that objective. 20 1 The meeting was co-chaired by Mr.
196. Bruce Zagaris, Luxembourg and U.S. Conclude Tax Treaty Whose Ratification
ProcessAwaits Conclusion of a MLAT, 12 Iwr'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 171, 172 (1996)
(explaining unique disposition of treaty).
197. See Bruce Zagaris, Developments in Mutual Cooperation, Coordination and Assistance Between the U.S. and Other Countries in International Tax Enforcement, 27 TAx
MGM'T INT'L J. 506, 508-09 (1998) (describing recent developments in U.S. tax
treaties).
198. See also Bruce Zagaris, Application of OECD Tax Haven Criteria to Member
States Shows PotentialDanger to U.S. Sovereignty, 22 TAx NOTES INT'L 2298, 2299-2301
(May 7, 2001) (discussing transparency issues); Bruce Zagaris, Issues Low Tax Regimes Should Raise When Negotiating with the OECD, 22 TAX NOTES INT'L 523, 529-30
(Jan. 29, 2001) (explaining transparency issues from low-tax regimes' perspective).
199. See generally, Press Release, OECD, Outcome, Conclusion of the Meeting
of the OECD Global Forum on Taxation in Berlin, 3-4 (June 4, 2004), at http://
www.oecd.org/document/5/0,2340,en_2649-201185-31967429-1_1_1_1,00.html
(describing meeting and resolutions).
200. See id. ("The meeting focused on specific proposals ... set[ting] forth a
process for moving towards a global level playing field consistent with the objective
).
of high standards of transparency and information exchange .
201. See id. (noting participation).
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Papali'i, Tommy Scanlan, Governor of the Central Bank of Samoa and Mr.
20 2
Bill McCloskey, Chair of the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs.
The meeting focused on specific proposals made by a sub-group of
the Global Forum, established at the Ottawa Global Forum meeting in
October 2003.203 The proposals set forth a process for moving toward a
global level playing field consistent with the objectives of high standards of
transparency and information exchange in tax matters in a way that is fair,
equitable and permits fair competition between all countries, large and
20 4
small, OECD and non-OECD.
The Global Forum looks forward to engaging in a dialogue with fi20 5
It
nancial centers that up to now have not participated in the process.
also looks forward to reviewing the outcome of the compilation of current
practices in transparency and information exchange at a future Global Forum meeting.
The reference to the fact that the Global Forum looks forward to engaging in a dialogue with financial centers that have not yet participated in
the process is further explained by the OECD paper A Processfor Achieving
a Global Level PlayingField, which was issued June 4, 2004.206 In particular,
the following countries have been identified as "significant financial
center[s]" that should be included in the process: Andorra, Barbados,
Brunei, Costa Rica, Dubai, Guatemala, Hong Kong-China, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Macao-China, Malaysia (Labuan), Marshall Islands, Monaco,
207
Philippines, Singapore and Uruguay.
Both the OECD and E.U. are striving to achieve effective exchange of
information and transparency by 2006, a deadline that is likely to be extended due to continuing controversies. In order to accomplish this goal,
they need a level playing field. An unknown variable is whether the E.U.
and OECD should provide incentives to the participating countries. For
instance, the E.U. savings tax directive requires the state from which the
investor resides to share some of the revenue withheld with the country
that withholds. Similarly, under the Caribbean Basin Recovery Act, the
U.S. government provides incentives to countries entering into tax information exchange agreements with the United States. Indeed, the OECD
harmful tax practices initiative is still very much a work in progress.
202. See id. (listing key actors).
203. See id. (describing establishment of group).
204. See id. (delineating objectives of group's proposals).
205. See id. (commenting on interest in opening up future dialogue with current non-participating group members).
206. See OECD Global Forum on Taxation, A Processfor Achieving a GlobalLevel

Playing Field, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/0/31967501.pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2005) (outlining OECD's plan to level economic playing field for all
nations).
207. See id. (naming financial centers).
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United Nations

In December 2004, at the eleventh meeting in Geneva, the Ad Hoc
Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters addressed
the issue of mutual assistance in tax collection, which is not dealt with in
Article 26 of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention concerning exchange of information. The subject of a new international instrument for promoting international assistance in tax collection in the
form of a multilateral convention on mutual administrative assistance in
tax matters was explored during the meeting. The Ad Hoc Group recommended the inclusion of new provisions on mutual assistance in tax collection. As a result, more developing countries will now have a model
provision to facilitate the inclusion of mutual assistance in their own income tax treaties. The U.N. provisions leave open the potential for developing countries to request some type of economic incentives in exchange
for including mutual assistance provisions in their tax treaties.
The U.N. General Assembly has adopted a resolution renaming the
Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters
the Committee or Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax
Matters. Its role would be, inter alia, to continue to work on the U.N.
Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing
Countries, the Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries, provide a framework for dialogue among national tax authorities to enhance and promote
international tax cooperation, provide a framework for dialogue to enhance and promote international tax cooperation among national tax authorities, consider how existing international tax norms could affect
different groups of countries and consider how new and emerging issues
could affect international cooperation in tax matters and develop recommendations for appropriate responses. In essence, the international tax
work of the U.N. would have a stronger institutional framework.
c.

European Union

The expanded E.U. is now a major force in all international organizations, especially the OECD. In this context its efforts to finalize a savings
tax directive have become exceedingly important in terms of influencing
other initiatives, such as the OECD harmful tax practices initiative.
On April 19, 2004, Joseph Deiss, Switzerland's President, said his
country, which is not a E.U. member, would not cooperate without a separate agreement on border controls and seven other arrangements with the
E.U. on matters such as agriculture and the environment. 20 8 That same
208. See generally Andrew Parker, Swiss Prepared to Delay EU Tax Directive, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at 6 (describing standoff between Switzerland and E.U. over

separate agreement on border controls).
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day, the E.U. announced that a separate dispute involving a customs levy
20 9
on Swiss exports could be resolved in the coming weeks.
The E.U. savings tax directive cannot take effect in January 2005 unless the Swiss Government has agreed to participate, along with the United
States, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino. Mr. Deiss and
the Swiss Government are concerned that the Schengen Convention
might dilute its banking secrecy regime due to ambiguous provisions on
information exchange between countries. The Swiss government wants
concessions to ensure its authorities need not exchange information on
210
tax evasion, which is not a criminal offense in Switzerland.
The Swiss government is also deferring an agreement to participate in
the OECD's proposals to exchange banking information with OECD countries until 2006. The proposal aims to verify people's tax liabilities. Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg also refused to support the 2006 deadline
2 11
due to their banking secrecy system.
The dispute between the E.U. and the Swiss over a customs levy on
Swiss exports arose anew after the Swiss showed annoyance in February
2004 at the imposition of an apparently new tax on re-exports to the E.U.
on certain Swiss-made products. 2 12 The E.U. claims that the tax on goods
re-exported to the E.U. from Switzerland was "not new" and that all E.U.
213
Members, except Germany, had been imposing the tax for some time.
Officials from both the E.U. and Switzerland have denied suggestions
from some observers that the customs levy was imposed to increase the
pressure on the Swiss authorities to agree to participate in the Savings Tax
2 14
Directive.
The Swiss' insistence on conditioning their participation in the savings tax directive on achieving agreements on other pending matters is
the latest in a long series of negotiations aimed at effectuating the directive. The Swiss, however, did reach a compromise with the United States
regarding international tax enforcement cooperation in tax matters by developing a definition for tax offenses qualifying for cooperation. This
209. See Ulrika Lomas, EU Claims Agreement Imminent On Swiss Re-export Tax

Dispute (Apr. 20, 2004), at http://www.tax-news.com/asp/story/story.asp?story
name=15755 (reporting resolution of E.U./Switzerland dispute regarding customs
tax).
210. See Marc G. Corrado, The Supreme Court's Impact on Swiss Banking Secrecy:
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 37 AM. U. L.

REv. 827, 841-42 (1988) (explaining that Swiss law criminalizes tax fraud but not
tax evasion).

211. See Parker, supra note 208 (explaining extent of standoff between E.U.
and other nations over new tax evasion standard).
212. See Lomas, supranote 209 (noting Swiss government's anger over E.U. re-

export tax).
213. See id. (describing E.U.'s attempts to refute Swiss government's notion

that new re-export taxes have been levied against them).
214. See id. (reporting denials by both Switzerland and the E.U. concerning
possible use of re-export tax to pressure Swiss into adopting E.U. Savings Tax
Directive).
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of the gap beagreement represented a compromise that bridged much
2 15
tween the differences in tax crimes in the two countries.
On April 26, 2004, E.U. member States agreed to new legislation designed to enhance authorities' cooperative efforts to clamp down on direct
tax evasion. 2 16 The legislation outlines certain areas where member States
excan undertake cross-border activities and engage in information
21 7
taxation.
gains
capital
and
company
income,
including
change,
"Modern technology and increased cross-border activity have made it
more important than ever for information exchange and cooperation between tax administrations to be improved," E.U. Taxation Commissioner
Frits Bolkestein said in a statement released after the Council of Ministers
approved the legislation. 218 "Tax dodgers and cheats must not be allowed
to get a free ride on the backs of honest taxpayers."2 19 The specific provisions in the legislation provide for several things:
[T]he possibility for member States to conduct simultaneous
control checks of the locally based activities of taxpayers operating in several countries of the E.U. and to share the information
obtained with each other; assurance that a member State that has
been requested to supply information will, if requested, carry out
certain administrative procedures on behalf of another member
state such as serving the taxpayer with an amended assessment;
and assurance that when a member state has to initiate inquiries
to obtain information needed by another country's tax agency, it
will treat the inquiry as if it were acting on its own behalf, as the
procedures are generally less complicated in domestic cases, and
220
provide the information more quickly.
"The legislation is a follow up to a report approved by E.U. member
States in 2000 that indicated E.U. legislation was inadequate to fight tax
fraud as well as to deal with the problems of under-invoicing and overinvoicing."2 2 ' In summation, "It]he commission said the new legislation
215. Id.
216. See Press Release, European Commission, Direct Taxation: Commission
Welcomes Adoption of Directive Strengthening Co-operation to Combat Fraud
(Apr. 26, 2004), at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference

=IP/04/539&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en (announcing agreement between E.U. member states "that is designed to speed up the flow
of information between the tax authorities" of those states).
217. See id. (outlining elements of Directive). See generallyJoe Kirwin, EUMember States Back Measure to Bolster Crackdown on Tax Evasion, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Apr.

27, 2004, at G-5 (summarizing provisions within E.U.'s new legislation "designed to
enhance authorities' cooperative efforts to clamp down on direct tax evasion").
218. See Kirwin, supra note 217 (expressing importance of cross-border information exchange between E.U. member states to combat tax evasion).
219. Id.
220. See id. (describing provisions of E.U. agreement).
221. Id.
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the pending information exwould complement other E.U. laws including
22 2
income."
savings
on
agreement
change
d.

Council of Europe

On January 25, 1988, the Council of Europe and the OECD opened
for signatures the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters. 223 On June 28, 1989, the United States signed it.2 24 On September 18, 1990, the U.S. Senate approved the treaty and it entered into force
with respect to the United States on April 1, 1995.225
Countries that are members of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or both, are
eligible parties to the treaty. Currently the treaty is in force in the following eight countries: Azerbaijan, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the United States. 22 6 Canada,
22 7
France and the Ukraine have signed, but have not ratified.
The Convention is not a typical tax treaty. Despite some vague references in the protocol, the Convention does not refer to the elimination of
double taxation. Instead, it provides a mutual assistance treaty to prevent
the evasion and avoidance of all taxes other than customs duties. It provides for a wide range of exchange of information between any two countries that are parties to the Convention. It also provides for assistance in
the collection of taxes and in the services of documents. The United
States, however, entered reservations on these types of assistance. Hence,
the United States will not assist in collecting taxes and will only serve documents by mail.
e.

Organizations of Tax Administrators

There is a web of international organizations, organized by regions
mostly, for tax administrators to meet regularly, discuss matters of mutual
interests and develop model agreements, laws, best practice approaches
and initiatives. These organizations include the Pacific Association of Tax
Administrators (PATA), the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrators
222. See id. (noting legislation's broad implications on additional E.U. laws
that regulate tax-based information exchanges).
223. See Kenneth Klein, Introduction to Council of Europe-Organisationfor Economic Co-Operationand Development, Convention on Mutual AdministrativeAssistance in
Tax Matters, 27 I.L.M. 1160 (1988) (summarizing convention, offering brief
description of created legislation), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
en/Treaties/Html/127.htm (providing full text and brief discussion of the
resolution).
224. See Council of Europe, Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in
Tax Matters: Signatures, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/Cherche
Sig.asp?NT=127&CM=8&DF=2/15/05&CL=ENG (last visited Mar. 10, 2005) (noting date of U.S. signing).
225. See id. (reporting date that U.S. adopted and effectuated treaty).
226. See id. (noting countries who have ratified treaty).
227. See id. (listing signatories who have yet to ratify treaty).
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(CIAT), the Caribbean Organization of Tax Administrators (COTA) and
228
the Nordic Group.
f. Ad Hoc Initiatives
Periodically tax authorities of different countries cooperate on matters of mutual interest, including matters of mutual enforcement interest,
such as tax shelters. During the weekend of April 23, 2004, the United
States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada announced they were
planning the creation of a Joint International Tax Shelter Information
Center (JITSIC), an international task force to combat abusive tax avoid2 29
ance schemes.
Tax officials from the four countries met in Williamsburg, Virginia, to
230
plan the development of a task force to combat tax-avoidance schemes.
Operations for the task force, staffed jointly between the four countries,
could be established in New York as early as the summer of 2005.231 This

task force will function as part of a broader plan to combat tax avoidance
promoters and encourage cooperation and information sharing between
the nations.
The task force will help create an Internet portal designed to keep an
online tally of tax avoidance schemes and shell companies, "encapsulating" a list of anti-tax avoidance plans. 232 If it is successful, the task force

could save the governments of the participating countries billions of U.S.
dollars in lost revenue and serve as a template for other developed na2 33
tions, similar to the OECD.

The plan includes identifying tax-avoidance schemes and the firms
that facilitate tax avoidance; pooling the participating nations' experience,
techniques and proven practices; facilitating action across international
boundaries; and examining developments in the tax industry to cut poten234
tial problems off at the start.
The four participating countries bring different specialized experience in fighting tax avoidance to the task force. The United Kingdom's
expertise lies in identifying and uncovering avoidance schemes, especially
228. See Review of the Inputs to the Substantive PreparatoryProcess and the International Conference on Financingfor Development, Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Financing for
Development, 3rd Sess., pt. 2, Annex 1, Agenda Item 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.257/xx
(2001), at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/aac257_27al.pdf (Oct. 2001) (listing
organizations).
229. See generally Sirena J. Scales, Multination Task Force Created to Combat Abusive Tax Avoidance, 2004 WORLDWIDE TAx DAILY 81-3, at 81-3 (2004) (describing
Williamsburg, Virginia meeting between tax officials of four nations).
230. See id. (stating that countries planned "the development of a task force to
battle tax-avoidace schemes").
231. See id. (speculating on date of setup for task force's operations).
232. See id. (discussing duties of task force).
233. See id. (explaining potential benefits of cooperation).
234. See id. (listing plan's goals).
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in corconcerning Value Added Tax (VAT), whereas the U.S. specializes
23 5
porate and income tax avoidance and offshore tax shelters.
To execute the plan formally the four countries signed a MOU, by
which the signatories agree to form aJITSIC. It will supplement the continuing work of tax administrations in identifying and stopping abusive tax
avoidance transactions, arrangements and schemes (which the MOU refers to as "abusive schemes") .236
The MOU provides for the JITSIC operations. The signatories will
each appoint officials to the JITSIC, who are trained and experienced in
tax examinations as they relate to abusive tax schemes. 23 7 The headquarters of the JITSIC will be in Washington, D.C. An Executive Steering
Group will be established to coordinate, oversee and evaluate the work of
the JITSIC. 2 38 It will hold meetings periodically in each member nation.

Pursuant to the domestic procedures of the signatories, the members of
JITSIC for that party will be delegated the ability to act as competent authorities for purposes of bilateral exchanges of information. 239 After
twelve months the signatories will conduct an initial review of the JITSIC
240
operations.
On May 3, 2004, the U.K. tax authorities issued a statement that an
initial focus of the work will target "the ways in which financial products
and derivative arrangements are used in abusive tax schemes by corporations and individuals to reduce their tax liabilities and the identification
of promoters developing and marketing those products and arrangements."

24 1

One media article reported that thirty leading U.K. companies

face investigations into their use of a tax avoidance scheme that could de2 42
prive the U.K Government of £lbn ($1.8bn) in revenues.
Officials involved in establishing the task force explained that part of
the long-term plan involved encouraging France and the OECD to take an
active role in the anti-avoidance activities. If the OECD joins the effort,
the result could be significant, especially for the jurisdictions and schemes
targeted. 2 43 For jurisdictions that may be the targets of the initiatives of
235. See id. (noting that each party brings different expertise to cooperative).
236. U.S. Internal Revenue Service, U.S. EstablishesJoint Task Force on Abusive
Tax Shelters with Canada,Australia, and UK., 2004 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 86-13, at
86-13 (2004) (announcing signing of agreement).
237. See id. (noting personnel appointed to Joint International Tax Shelter
Information Centre (JITSIC)).
238. See id. (listing executive oversight established forJITSIC).
239. See id. (discussing legal ability to exchange information between JITSIC
members).
240. See id. (presenting full test of memorandum of understanding (MOU)).
241. Andrew Parker, UK Companies Face Probe Over Use of Tax Avoidance Scheme,
FIN. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at 1.
242. See id. (stating that "[mI]ore than 30 leading UK companies face investigations into their use of a tax avoidance scheme that could deprive the government of Pounds lbn in revenues").
243. See Scales, supra note 229, at 81-3 (describing potential savings of
cooperation).
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the task force, the issues of a level playing field, blacklists, economic sanctions and others that existed and continue in the design and implementation of the OECD's harmful tax practices initiative are likely to arise.
Meanwhile, the IRS has various initiatives to contest tax shelters. A federal
grand jury in the Southern District of New York is presently investigating
international tax shelter activities. The U.S. Congress, especially the Senate Permanent Investigative Subcommittee, has also reviewed the abuse of
various tax shelters. As the revenue of the participating countries continues to suffer erosion, due to the ability of professional advisers and taxpayers to take advantage of gaps among tax laws and systems, revenue
authorities and other interested persons undoubtedly will scrutinize the
ability of the JITSIC to produce results.
D.

Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-TerrorismFinancialEnforcement

An area of dynamic development for international organizations has
been in anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financial
enforcement.
1.

Global Organizations

a.

The United Nations

i.

Conventions

The United Nations pioneered international AML cooperation with
the 1988 Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, which requires signatories to criminalize money
laundering and immobilize the assets of persons involved in illegal narcotics trafficking. 244 Because the Convention was an initial effort and the
participating governments were so diverse, there were differences in each
country's criminalization of money laundering, enforcement methods,
number of convictions and range of punishments. 24 5 Nevertheless, subsequent efforts have drawn from the Vienna Convention and utilize, wherever possible, the same terminology and systematic approach. The U.N.
pioneered the 1988 Vienna Convention against the Trafficking in Illegal
Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances, which contains the requirements to
criminalize money laundering and immobilize the assets of persons involved in illegal narcotics trafficking.
The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism prohibits direct or complicit involvement in the international and unlawful provision or collection of funds, attempted or
actual, with the intent or knowledge that any part of the funds may be
244. See generally Convention Against Illicit Traffic in NarcoticDrugs and Psycho-

tropic Substances, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15, reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 493, 493-96 (1989) (presenting full text of treaty).
245. See Global Programme Against Money Laundering, supra note 129 (presenting model legislation).
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used to carry out any of the offenses described in the Convention.2 46 Such
acts include those intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any
person not actively involved in armed conflict in order to intimidate a population and any act intended to compel a government or an international
organization to take action or abstain from taking action. 24 7 The Convention's offenses are deemed to be extraditable crimes; signatories must establish their jurisdiction over them, make them punishable by appropriate
penalties, take alleged offenders into custody, prosecute or extradite those
offenders, cooperate in preventive measures and countermeasures and exchange information and evidence needed in related criminal
proceedings.

2 48

The Convention requires each signatory to take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the detection,
freezing, seizure and forfeiture of any funds used or allocated for the purposes of committing the listed offenses.2 49 Article 18(1) requires signatories to subject financial institutions and banking professionals to "Know
Your Customer" requirements and the filing of suspicious transaction reports.2 50 Additionally, Article 18(2) requires signatories to cooperate in
preventing the financing of terrorism through the licensing of money service businesses and other measures to detect or monitor cross-border
25 1
transactions.
Another treaty with important AML/CTFE provisions is the 2000 Palermo Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2 52 which contains three supplementary protocols: (1) to prevent, suppress and punish
trafficking in persons, especially women and children; (2) to stop the
smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air; and (3) to stop the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking of firearms, their parts, components and ammunition. 253 This Convention seeks to strengthen governmental power in
combating serious crimes by providing a basis for stronger common action
against money laundering through synchronized national laws, so that no
uncertainty exists as to whether a crime in one country is also a crime in
another. Signatory countries pledge to: (1) criminalize offenses committed by organized crime groups, including corruption and corporate or
company offenses; (2) combat money laundering and seize the proceeds
of crime; (3) accelerate and extend the scope of extradition; (4) protect
246. See InternationalConvention for the Suppression of the Financingof Terrorism,

G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109, reprinted in
39 I.L.M. 270, 271-72 (2000) (summarizing broad prohibitions developed during
Convention).
247. See id. at 271 (presenting full text of convention).
248. See id. at 273 (noting punishable offenses).
249. See id. at 274 (explaining requirements convention places on member
countries).
250. See id. at 277 (describing requirements placed on banking community).
251. See id. (presenting convention's monitoring requirements).
252. See TOCC, supra note 133 (presenting full text of convention).
253. See id. (describing supplemental protocols).
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witnesses testifying against criminal groups; (5) strengthen cooperation to
locate and prosecute suspects; (6) enhance prevention of organized crime
at the national and international levels; and (7) develop a series of protocols containing measures to combat specific acts of transnational organized crime. 254 The signatories must establish regulatory regimes to deter
and detect all forms of money laundering, including customer identification, record keeping and reporting of suspicious transactions. 2 55 In these
respects, the Convention's provisions are similar to those found in the
256
FATF's Forty Recommendations.
In addition to conventions, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime has
drafted model laws such as the Model Legislation on Laundering, Confiscation and International Cooperation in Relation to the Proceeds of
Crime 257 and, in response to its expansion into the realm of CTFE, the
Model Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and Terrorist Financing
Bill. 258 The Office on Drugs and Crime provides technical assistance on

legislative drafting, financial intelligence, capacity building and a range of
services to help governments and law enforcement agencies implement
their obligations under the Vienna Convention and related AML
259
initiatives.
ii.

Security Council Resolution 1373260

On September 12, 2001, the United Nations Security Council
adopted Resolution 1368, condemning the 9/11 attacks and calling on all
States to work together to quickly bring to justice those who perpetrated
them, as well as those "responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the
perpetrators." 26 1 The Resolution also called on the international community to increase efforts "to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by
increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant interna254. See id. (presenting pledges of signatory nations).
255. See id. (explaining member nations' requirements).
256. Compare The World Bank and International Monetary Fund, Reference
Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, 111-3-111-4
(Mar. 30, 2003), at http://wwwl.worldbank.org,finance/assets/images/03-chap
03-f.qxd.pdf (listing TOCC provisions), with id. at 111-9 (discussing FATF Forty
Recommendations).
257. See Global Programme Against Money Laundering, supra note 129 (presenting full text of model legislation).
258. See Model Money Laundering, supra note 130 (displaying bill).
259. See id. (listing numerous technical services provided by U.N. Office on
Drugs and Crime).
260. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, The United Nations Acts to Combat Terrorism, 17
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 469, passim (2001) (describing passing of and contents
of U.N. resolution); Bruce Zagaris, UN Security Council Hears Progress of CounterTerrorism Committee, 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 113, passim (2002) (noting
counter-terrorism developments).
261. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at § 3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1368 (2001) (reacting to 9/11 attacks on U.S.).
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tional anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions." 26 2 Finally, the Resolution expressed the Security Council's preparedness to
take "all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September
263
2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism."
On September 28, 2001, the Security Council adopted the U.S.-sponsored Resolution 1373, which called on all member States to: (1) "prevent
and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;" (2) freeze without delay the
resources of terrorists and terror organizations; (3) prohibit anyone from
making funds available to terrorist organizations; (4) suppress the recruitment of new members by terrorism organizations and eliminate their
weapon supplies; (5) "deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support
or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens" to terrorists; (6) "[a]fford
one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations" involving terrorism; (7) prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and control over
travel documentation; and (8) cooperate in any campaign against ter26 4
rorists, including one involving the use of force.
While it contains strong language, the resolution still has gray areas,
such as its failure to define the term "terrorist." Invoking Chapter 7 of the
U.N. Charter, which requires all member States to cooperate and gives the
Security Council authority to take action, including the use of force,
against those who refuse to do so, the resolution draws on several commitments that have already been made in treaties and past resolutions and
made them immediately binding on all member States. 265 Many of its
clauses require changes in national laws, such as those dealing with border
2 66
controls and asylum.
From an implementation perspective, an important aspect of Resolution 1373 is the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee
262. Id. § 4. The resolutions especially to be adhered to included the specifically-mentioned Resolution 1269, S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4053rd
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (1999) (encouraging nations to fight terrorism); as
well as Resolution 1267, S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4051st mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999) (demanding Taliban to deliver Osama bin Laden to international authorities); and Resolution 1333, S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 55th
Sess., 4251st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000) (demanding Taliban to stop supporting terrorism).
263. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 261, § 5.
264. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1373 (2001) (explaining new terrorism-related requirements). No terrorist
organizations were specifically cited in the resolution. Id.
265. See Serge Schmemann, U.N.Requires Members to Act Against Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at Al (discussing nature of resolution).
266. Human Rights Watch has noted the possibility that these changes may
involve new and overbroad statutes that will impinge on basic liberties. See Human
Rights Watch, In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide, A
Human Rights Watch BriefingPaperfor the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights 4-5 (Mar. 25, 2003), at http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/counterterrorism-bck.htm (noting that Resolution 1373 calls for tough measures, but
makes no assurances that member states respect international human rights).
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(CTC) of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council,
26 7
The
to monitor member States' implementation of the resolution.
CTC is divided into three five-member subcommittees, each of which overresees one-third of the U.N. member States. 268 All member States must 269
port to the CTC on the steps they have taken toward implementation.
It is the duty of the CTC to review these reports and advise the appropriate
subcommittee on whether it should follow up with a particular member
state to achieve compliance with the resolution and whether the member
state requires assistance in that regard. 270 Although the CTC will not define terrorism in a legal sense, its work will help develop minimum standards for an international CTFE regime.
iii.

Initial Results

On August 25, 2004, the United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team issued its first report pursuant to U.N. Resolution
individuals and
1526 concerning A] Qaeda and the Taliban and associated
27 1
entities. Unfortunately, the report was not positive.
Al Qaeda provides practical and religious inspiration. Any group that
shares its political objectives and religious beliefs and has the necessary
initiative, resources and determination can make attacks in its name, using
similar methodology. Al Qaeda has inspired such "franchise" or "copycat"
operations whereby groups with little or no direct contact with the central
leadership can become affiliates. For instance, the group responsible for
bombing commuter trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004, had no organizational link with Al Qaeda leadership. The attacks were done by people
who were relatively well established and integrated within their community and were not considered by Spanish authorities to pose an imminent
threat.
Iraq provides a focus for Al Qaeda activity and propaganda. It has
provided an attractive alternative to fighters who might otherwise have
267. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 264, § 6 (discussing implementation of
resolution).
268. See Counter-Terrorism Committee, How Does the CTC Work with States?

(2003), at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/work.html (describing
function and organization of CTC).
269. See id. (same)

270. See id. (same).
271. See United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 23 August 2004 from the
Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267
(1999) ConcerningAl-Qaeda and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to the Presidentand the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/679 (2004), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO4/469/63/PDF/N04469
63.pdf (noting that five years after Security Council adopted Resolution 1267,
threat of Al Qaeda continues and thus Security Council should consider new and
different efforts to manage terrorist threats). See generally Warren Hoge, UN. Seeks
Tighter Sanctions as Qaeda Skirts Money Controls, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at A7
(addressing financial ability of Al Qaeda and need for additional United Nations
sanctions and efforts to combat Al Qaeda threat).
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gone to Afghanistan. The Afghan authorities note a correlation between
the levels of activity in Iraq and the number of attacks in their own
country.
Most importantly, the report finds that there is no prospect of an
early end to attacks from Al Qaeda-associated terrorists. The terrorists will
continue to attack targets, both Muslim and non-Muslim, according to the
resources they have available and the opportunities that occur. They will
look for ways to attack both high profile and soft targets.
Without an internationally accepted definition of terrorism, Security
Council sanctions against the Taliban, Al Qaeda and their associates apply
to a list of designated individuals, groups and entities. The list should
reflect international agreement on which groups and individuals pose the
greatest danger. For several reasons, the list has started to lose credibility
and operational value. It now requires updating in terms of its relevance
and accuracy.
The report states that, while the sanctions against the financing of
terrorism have had some effect and some millions of dollars of assets have
been frozen, these sanctions should be updated based on how Al Qaeda
raises and transfers its money. The travel ban and arms embargo should
be revised to reflect current Al Qaeda methodology.
The Security Council wants to consider new measures to enhance international cooperation and to support national efforts. The Analytical
Support and Monitoring Team has proposals for the improvement of the
current measures and ideas from which new ones might be formulated.
The team thinks it can generate wider support for the list by the introduction of technical improvements and the submission of new names. The
team also believes it can encourage closer operational cooperation between States to make the international environment more difficult for Al
Qaeda-related terrorism.
The report opines that the sanctions regime has had limited impact.
Al Qaeda has shown great flexibility and adaptability in staying ahead of
such sanctions. Al Qaeda's structure has evolved to its current manifestation as a loose network of affiliated underground groups with certain common goals. Some countries have questioned the efficacy and relevance of
the sanctions. Some countries have regarded the measures imposed by
the Security Council as too difficult to enforce and of secondary importance to other counter-terrorism activity within their jurisdiction.
A practical problem has been that the consolidated list contains
names of individuals whose full identity and whereabouts are uncertain.
To make the list more useful, the report recommends that the names be
accompanied by date of birth, nationality and passport information. The
list must correct inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the spelling and transliteration of names and seek a standard approach. Twenty-one states have
submitted names for inclusion on the list, which at the time of the report
comprised 143 individuals and one entity associated with the Taliban and
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174 individuals and 111 entities associated with Al Qaeda. The comparatively small number of countries contributing to the list suggests that many
States are reluctant to provide names. Issues of due process and concerns
over the definition of Taliban and Al Qaeda may also make some States
reluctant to provide names for inclusion on the list. The list has had to
avoid accusations of political point scoring and of subjectivity.
An unresolved issue is the procedure by which a name may be removed from the list, whether by a listing State or as a result of appeal by
the individual or entity concerned. Subject to the agreement of the Committee, the Monitoring Team plans to examine current de-listing procedures, especially concerning appeals against listings submitted by
individuals or entities that have difficulty in doing so through their governments. The report recommends developing mechanisms to remove
the names of dead persons as soon as circumstances allow and to enable
countries to notify the 1267 Committee when someone on the list is detained and share internationally any useful information that results from
their investigation. The report recommends that national authorities ensure that security and intelligence agencies are aware of the list and its
purpose, as well as those with responsibility for the enforcement of the
sanctions. The Monitoring Team will suggest how entries might be standardized and the general format of the list improved. The Monitoring
Team will review the sections of the Committee's guidelines that are relevant to the list and recommend revisions if appropriate.
A major consideration is that Al Qaeda's operations are economical.
Only the sophisticated attacks of September 11, 2001, required funding of
more than six figures. The embassy bombing attacks in Kenya and
Tanzania in August 1998, the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in
Aden, the Bali bombings in October 2002, the 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, the November 2003 attacks in Istanbul and the March
272
2004 attacks in Madrid individually cost well under six figures.
The report expressed concerns that although many States have
merely amended anti-money-laundering legislation to cover terrorist
crime, terrorist-related financial transactions generally occur before the
crime, while the CTFE laws are designed essentially to deal with the proceeds of crime. Increasingly Al Qaeda and its associates are using alternative means to raise and move their assets in ways that are less open to
scrutiny. The Monitoring Team will recommend to the Committee that
States circulate the consolidated list beyond their banks to non-bank financial institutions and to any non-financial entities where assets might be
held. The Monitoring Team will look at the increased use of alternative
remittance systems, cash couriers and charities and other nonprofit organizations to fund terrorist operations.
272. See Hoge, supra note 271 (noting that each terrorist attack since September 11, 2001 cost less than $50,000).
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The report finds an important reason for non-reporting has been the
complexity and volume of reports required from States that clearly lack
the capacity to produce them. Some States lack the human resources necessary to produce reports and the national supervisory and coordination
mechanisms needed to gather the information required. A need exists for
some States to bring their national agencies responsible for counter-terrorism into the reporting process. The quality of the reports varies. The
reporting culture of States is partly to blame. Some States find it easier to
report what has been done politically rather than at the operational level.
The questions asked appear to overlap in some cases with the reporting
requirements of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, exacerbating the confusion as to where the boundaries between the two Committees are.
The Monitoring Team will consult a wide range of national authorities directly engaged in counter-terrorism to develop ideas as to what further measures might be useful for the Security Council to consider. The
Monitoring Team will endeavor to engage States, that through a lack of
capacity or other reasons, make less of a contribution to international efforts against Al Qaeda-associated terrorism than they might otherwise
27 3
make.
b.

274
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering

In 1989, the G7 275 established the FATF to serve as an international
clearinghouse for ideas and recommendations on how to curtail money
laundering. 276 In keeping with the post-September l1th international
trend of merging AML and CTFE regimes, however, the FATF has since
expanded its mission to include efforts to stem terrorist financing. Operationally, the FATF relies on a sophisticated network of FATF-style regional
bodies throughout the world to elaborate typologies charting money laundering trends and formulate appropriate responses and mutual evaluations customized to respond to the circumstances of the members of such
bodies.

2 77

273. For more information on the U.N. sanctions against Al Qaeda and the
Taliban, see Bruce Zagaris, UN Reports Problems with InternationalSanctions Against Al
Qaeda, 20 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 476, 477 (2004) (describing global Al Qaeda
network).
274. This section is derived substantially from Bruce Zagaris, FATFAdopts New
Standards to Combat TerroristFinancing,17 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 493 (2001).
275. The G7, now the G8 with the addition of Russia, was comprised of heads
of state of the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Britain and

the European Community. See University of Toronto G8 Information Centre, What
is the G8?, at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/what isg8.html (last modified Jan. 25,
2005) (describing participants and substance of G8 summit).
276. See FATF, More About the FATF and its Work, at http://wwwl.oecd.org/
fatf/AboutFATFen.htm (last modified May 14, 2004) (describing tasks of FATF in
combating money laundering and terrorist financing worldwide). The FATF currently has thirty-one member countries and territories. Id.
277. These include the Caribbean FATF, the FATF in South America, the
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-
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The FATF's recently updated Forty Recommendations, 2 78 when combined with the eight (and now nine) Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, 2 79 create a comprehensive laundry list of every major
step nations and institutions should take to combat money laundering and
terrorist financing. They cover ratification of international agreements,
criminalization of relevant activities, due diligence requirements and the
kinds of financial institutions that are bound to meet them, assistance to
foreign countries and implementation of terrorist list sanctions. Each
FATF member must self-assess its compliance with the Recommendations
and report to the FATF, which will then "name and shame" non-cooperating countries and territories (NCCTs).280 FATF standards require financial institutions to pay enhanced scrutiny to transactions with persons in
NCCTs. Hence, adverse economic consequences occur from making the
list of NCCTs.
If an NCCT does not take effective measures to address and solve the
problems the FATF views as non-compliance with the world AML/CTFE
regime, the FATF can recommend that counter-measures be taken against
the NCCT. These sanctions punish entities located within NCCTs by establishing enhanced due diligence requirements for financial institutions
that deal with them and notification to their business partners that they
may be money launderers.28 1 These measures have been in effect against

Money Laundering Group and the MONEYVAL Committee. See id. (noting regional and international anti-money laundering initiatives, including regional and
national bodies and work performed in reviewing money laundering trends). In
addition to the organizations discussed herein, the G8, the G20, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Customs Organization, the Commonwealth Secretariat, Europol, Interpol, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, the Financial Stability Forum, the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Offshore Group
of Banking Supervisors, the European Central Bank and various development
banks play important roles in developing the international AML/CTFE regime
through raising awareness, developing methodologies, building institutional capacity and research and development. See id. (same).
278. FATF, The Forty Recommendations (2003), at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/
40Recsen.htm.
279. FATF, Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (Oct. 31, 2001), at
http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/SRecTF-en.pdf.
280. For the current list of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories, see
FATF, Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs), at http://wwwl.oecd.org/
fatf/ncct en.htm (last modified Oct. 27, 2004). In deciding whether or not to
identify a country or territory as non-cooperative, the FATF considers twenty-five
criteria; further criteria govern removal from the list of NCCTs. See FATF, Annual
Review of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories,App. 1-2 (June 30, 2003), at http://
wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/NCCT2003-en.pdf (setting forth list of criteria for noncooperative countries or territories).
281. FATF, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories, supra note
280, App. 2.
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Nauru since December 2001,282 and other nations, such as Ukraine and
2 83
Myanmar, have been threatened with them.

In 2002, the FATF, in partnership with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, created a new methodology to assess nations' compliance with AML/CTFE standards, drawing heavily from the FATF's Forty
Recommendations and Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, as well as international conventions. 28 4 The FATF will utilize this
methodology in future NCCT evaluations and the IMF and World Bank
have included it as part of their own assessments of their members in pursuance of a program resulting from the extension of a one-year pilot program ending November 2003.285

c.

IMF/World Bank Group

Until 2001 and thereafter, the IMF resisted proactive involvement in
anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financial enforcement. It
perceived its role as helping with financial regulation, but not in enforcement and criminal law. More recently, as its large shareholders have demanded that it become more actively involved in the AML and CTF
regulatory and enforcement regimes, the IMF has begun to quickly participate. Subsequently, the IMF decided to become involved in AML/CFT
policy due to prudential and macroeconomic effects of money laundering
on national and international financial systems. In particular, the IMF
worried that money laundering and large-scale criminal organizations
would undermine, corrupt and destabilize markets and even smaller economies. The tell-tale signs have been in inexplicable changes in money demand, greater prudential risks to bank soundness, contamination effects
on legal financial transactions and greater volatility of international capital
flows and exchange rates due to unanticipated cross-border asset transfers.
The IMF is contributing to the efforts of the FATF in several important ways, consistent with the IMF's core areas of competence. As a collaborative institution with near universal membership, the IMF is a natural
forum for sharing information, developing common approaches to issues
282. See id. at 12 (noting history of Nauru's non-compliance).
283. See id. at 10-11 (noting history of Ukraine and Myanmar's non-compliance); Press Release, FATF, FATF Decides to Impose Counter-Measures on Myanmar (Nov. 3, 2003), at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/PR-20031103_en.pdf
(asking members to take countermeasures against Myanmar because it has not
addressed deficiencies noted in June 2001).
284. See generally FATF, Methodology .for Assessing Compliance with Anti-Money
Laundering and Combating the Financingof Terrorism Standards (Oct. 11, 2002), at
http://wwwl.oedc.org/fatf/pdf/meth-2002_en.pdf (describing system and associated assessment criteria used to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing).
285. See Press Release, IMF, IMF Executive Board Approves 12-Month AntiMoney Laundering Pilot Project (Nov. 22, 2002), at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/sec/pr/2002/pr0252.htm (summarizing money laundering pilot project and
uses by various groups).
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and promoting the AML and CTF regulatory and enforcement policies
and standards developed by FATF. In addition, the Fund has unique expertise due to its broad experience in conducting financial sector assessments, providing technical assistance in the financial sector and exercising
surveillance over members' exchange systems.
After September 11, 2001, the IMF identified new ways to advance its
contribution to international efforts to combat money laundering and the
financing of terrorism. In cooperation with the World Bank, it took some
important steps:
(1) It added the FATF Forty Recommendations and Eight Special
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing to the list of areas and associated standards and codes for which Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) can be prepared.
(2) In partnership with the World Bank, the FATF and the FSRBs, it
participated in a twelve-month pilot program of AML/CFT assessments of
forty-one jurisdictions, which was completed in October 2003. A further
twelve assessments have been completed since then.
(3) Along with the World Bank, it substantially increased technical
assistance to member countries on strengthening financial, regulatory and
supervisory frameworks for AML-CFT. In 2002-2003, there were eighty-five
country-specific technical projects benefitting sixty-three countries and
thirty-two regional projects reaching more than 130 countries. In 2004,
the pace of technical assistance has intensified further.
Following a March 2004 review of the pilot program, the IMF Executive Board agreed to make AML/CFT assessments a regular part of IMF
work. It also endorsed the revised FATF Forty Recommendations as the
standard for which AML/CFT ROSCs will be prepared, as well as a revised
methodology to assess compliance with that standard. Drawing on the
positive experience under the twelve-month pilot program, the Executive
Board decided to expand the Fund's AML/CFF assessments and technical
assistance work to cover the full scope of the expanded FATF
recommendations.
AML/CFT assessments are usually prepared within the framework of
the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), another joint IMFWorld Bank initiative, which is specifically designed to assess the strengths
and weaknesses of financial sectors. The IMF conducts the AML/CFT assessments with the FSAP as part of voluntary assessments of Offshore Financial Centers.
The initiative taken by the IMF has catapulted multilateral development banks (MDBs) into the business of providing technical assistance
and surveillance with respect to AML and CFT regulatory and enforcement regimes. For instance, the Inter-American Development Bank has
provided substantial technical and financial assistance to its members in
establishing FIUs.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss3/4
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The universal membership of countries in the IMF and regional
MDBs has minimized some of the more controversial aspects of FATF's
standards. At least the small countries have a seat at the tables and believe
that the setting and implementation of AML/CFT policies have more legitimacy. Nevertheless, even in the IMF and MDBs, small countries believe
the process does not afford adequate abilities to present their views. Another contribution of the IMF and World Bank to establish AML/CTF regulatory and enforcement regimes is the publication of professional
literature.
2.

Regional Organizations

Regional organizations have been important actors in formulating
and implementing AML and CTFE regimes. Organizations with universal
membership can have difficulty designing and implementing policies and
laws that are customized to the needs of various regions because each one
has unique institutions, legal systems and cultures. By working more
closely with area states, a regional organization can gain the respect of
governmental and non-governmental actors, thus increasing the level of
its authority and effectiveness in accomplishing regional priorities. This
28 6
cooperation is essential to the success of the new AML/CTFE regime.
a.

Europe

The Council of Europe's 1990 Convention on Laundering, Search,
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime obligates signatories
to cooperate in the AML regime. 28 7 The E.U.'s Directive on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, amended in December 2001,288 is significant in its breadth; it applies

due diligence requirements to numerous actors in the private sector, including lawyers and accountants, whenever they conduct a financial transaction or engage in financial planning. Because European nations
dominate the FATF and many other international organizations, 28 9 their
policies play a critical political role in the design and implementation of
the AML/CTFE regime.
286. For additional discussion of the interplay between national governments
and non-governmental organizations, see Bruce Zagaris, InternationalMoney Laundering, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE MANCOOPERATION, 138, 13842 (Robert S. Jordon ed., 4th ed. 2001)
(discussing various groups and participation in regulation of international
money).
287. See Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the
Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991) (outlining duties of parties under treaty).
288. Council Directive 2001/97/EC amending Council Directive 91/308/
EEC on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money
Laundering, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 76.
289. See FATF, Members and Observers, at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/membersen.htm (last modified Jan. 27, 2005) (listing FATF members).
AGEMENT OF
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Ten days after the September 11th attacks on the United States, officials from the E.U. member States met to show their solidarity. At the
meeting, the European Council called for the broadest possible global coalition against terrorism, to act under the auspices of the U.N., and approved over thirty measures to expand the AML/CTFE regime in
Europe.290 These included agreements to introduce a Europe-wide arrest
warrant, 29 1 adopt a common definition of terrorism, 292 create a list of
known and presumed terrorists, establish joint investigative teams and
make combating terrorism and its financing a higher law enforcement priority293 and implement all international AML/CTFE agreements as soon
as possible 294 and support the Indian proposal to draft a comprehensive
U.N. convention on international terrorism. 29 5 The Council also called
for each member state to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit, a central
290. See Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001, 2001 O.J. (SN 140) 1, available at http://
europa.en.int/comm/external-relations/110901/actplan0l.pdf
[hereinafter
Council Meeting] (stating E.U.'s unequivocal support for United States and broad
measures that will be enacted to support American people); Peter Norman, Assault
on America Europe Responds-Stage Set for Leaders to Show Solidarity, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
21, 2001, at 4 (noting European Union's break from norms in foreign policy to
show support for United States); Peter Norman, Stronger Ties Urged Between Police
Forces, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at 4 (highlighting cooperative steps taken by European Union since September 11 attacks to ensure security and protection of
citizens).
291. The agreement entered into force on January 1, 2004. See DirectorateGeneral,Justice and Home Affairs, European Commission, European Arrest Warrant
to Replace Extradition (2002), available at http://www.nd.edu/-nanovic/events/european-arrest-warrant2002.pdf (providing that agreement will go into effect at beginning of 2004).
292. See Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the Application
of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 93, amended by
Council Common Position of 12 September 2003 updating Common Position
2001/93/CFSP on the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism and
repealing Common Position 2003/482/CFSP, 2003 O.J. (L 229) 42 (setting forth
definitions for persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts).
293. See, e.g., Press Release, United States Mission to the European Union,
U.S., E.U. Sign Legal Assistance, Extradition Treaties (June 25, 2003), at http://
www. useu. be / TransAtlantic / US-EU % 20Summits/June2503WashingtonSummit
(noting efforts of cooperation between European Union and United States and
recognizing treaties aimed at fighting international terrorism).
294. The six E.U. members who had not yet signed the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism by the time of the meeting
did so within one month after the meeting. See International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Dec. 9, 1999), at http://untreaty.un.
org/ENGLISH/Status/Chapter.xviii/treatyll.asp (summarizing signature, ratification and declarations and reservations of all participating countries).
295. The proposal is currently being considered by a working group of the
United Nations, along with a draft international convention for the suppression of
acts of nuclear terrorism. See Report of the Working Group on Measures to Eliminate
InternationalTerrorism, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 57th Sess., pt.1, Agenda Item 160,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/57/L.9 (2002) (summarizing efforts to draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism).
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state agency serving as a clearinghouse for information related to money
29 6
laundering.
In 2002, the E.U. released its first list of terrorists, terrorist organizations and their supporters, similar to the U.S. list.29 7 The regulations governing the E.U. list, however, also provide for greater safeguards against
the mistaken listing of non-terrorists, including checks before listing, an
appeals process and sanctions for wrongly listing entities. They also exempt from freezing any funds related to everyday living as well as those
2 98
used to cover legal costs.
On December 7, 2004, the E.U. finance ministers agreed to the third
directive on anti-money laundering, targeting in part the measures specifically used to finance terrorism.
The European Parliament still must approve before the directive becomes law. It will require any business that accepts payments in cash exceeding 15,000 euros ($19,992) to file currency transactions reports.
Additionally, persons wanting to send 15,000 euros in cash or more
outside the E.U. must obtain special permission.
The proposed directive requires financial institutions to identify their
clients in cases of suspicious transactions. They will also have to identify
the beneficiary owner of a business deal or transaction to make sure suspect individuals cannot use business fronts. E.U. efforts to crack down on
methods used to finance terrorism have been criticized in the past by Bush
administration officials. The United States, however, has welcomed this
latest move, especially the restrictions on the movement of 15,000 euros in
cash. As adopted by the E.U. Council of Economic and Finance Ministers,
the directive will include the following: the obligation of financial institutions to identify the beneficial owner of a business or related transaction in
order to ensure full "know your customer" and transparency; the introduction of the so-called risk-based approach whereby institutions that are affected by the directive must assess for themselves to what extent they must
carry out client identification (i.e., "Know Your Customer") measures; ex296. See Council Meeting, supra note 290 (setting forth efforts to combat
funding of terrorism; Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, Statement of
Purpose) (June 13, 2001), at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/EDstat-20016_en.pdf
(establishing cooperation among Financial Intelligence Units participating in
Egmont Group).
297. See Council Regulation (EC) 881/2002 Imposing Certain Specific Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities Associated with
Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida Network and the Taliban, 2002 0.J. (L 139) 9,
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l139/l_1392001
0523en0090010.pdf (outlining persons, groups and entities subject to freezing of
funds); see also Council Regulation (EC) 2580/2001 on Specific Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities with a View to Combating Terrorism, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 70, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/oj/
dat/2001/1l344/l34420011228en00700075.pdf (establishing regulations to be
imposed on persons, groups or entities facilitating terrorism).
298. See Council Regulation (EC) 881/2002, supra note 297 (noting exceptions to frozen funds).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005

61

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 4

570

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: p. 509

tension of the scope of the directive to cover all companies that accept
cash payments of 15,000 euros and not just specific "risk" groups; and a
requirement for each member state to supervise the compliance of the
measures by the affected institutions. The Commission said it hoped the
final adoption of the revamped money-laundering directive would be approved before the end of 2005.
b.

The Americas

In 1996, the Organization of American States (OAS), comprised of all
thirty-five independent nations in the Americas, 29 9 established the InterAmerican Drug Abuse Control Commission to combat drug abuse, including AML measures. 30 0 To that end, the Commission wrote Model Regulations that include provisions regarding the establishment of FIUs and
CTFE measures after 2002.301 Also in that year, another OAS body, the
Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE),302 helped prepare the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, which-building
on existing international instruments-includes many AML/CTFE provisions such as due diligence and mutual assistance requirements. 30 3 Together, these bodies operate training seminars, provide technical
assistance to OAS member States and release reports on the current state
of the AML/CTFE regime in the Americas. They have also worked with
the Inter-American Development Bank to fund member States' efforts to
eliminate money laundering and the financing of terrorism and establish
304
and effectively operate FIUs.
299. See Organization of American States (OAS), About the OAS, Member States
and Permanent Missions (2005), at http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/memberstates.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2005) (listing OAS member states).
300. See Statute of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, OAS

AG/Res. 1457, 27th Sess. OAS Doc. XXVII-O/97, Articles 1-32 (1997), available at
http://www.cicad.oas.org/EN/basicdocuments/Statute.asp

(establishing and de-

fining mission of Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission).
301. See Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, Model Regulations
Concerning Laundering Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Other Serious
Offenses (2003), available at http://www.cicad.oas.org/LavadoActivos/ENG/
ModelRegulations.asp (establishing Financial Intelligence Units).
302. See OAS, Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism,
OAS A.G. Res. 1650, 29th Sess., OAS Doc. XXIX-O/99 (1999), at http://www.oas.
org/juridico/english/ga-res99/eresl650/htm (establishing Inter-American Committee against Terrorism to promote cooperation to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism).
303. See Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against
Terrorism, OAS A.G. Res. 1840, 32nd Sess., OAS Doc. XXXII-O/02 (2003), at http:/
(adopting
/www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs-en/docs-items/AGresl840.htm
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism).
304. For instance, in May 2001, the Bank's Multilateral Investment Fund approved a $1,230,000 grant to assist eight South American countries in their efforts
to establish and improve their Financial Intelligence Units. See Press Release, Inter-American Development Bank, Multilateral Investment Fund Approves Financing to Fight Money Laundering in Latin America (June 26, 2002), at http://
www.iadb. org/news/display/prview. cfm? PRNum= 142 / 02 &Language=English
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The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the oldest
FATF regional style organization, is one of the most active FATF-style regional bodies.3 0 5 Often working together with the Caribbean Anti-Money
Laundering Program, the CFATF organizes symposia and training courses
for regulators and private sector professionals to increase awareness and
expertise within the region about AML and CTFE initiatives. 30 6 It has also
created its own list of Nineteen Recommendations to mirror those of the
30 7
FATF, but tailored to meet the unique needs of the Caribbean region.
The primary focus of the CFATF, however, has been on drafting and testing typologies of money laundering in the fields of non-bank financial institutions, casinos and the gaming industry; international transactions,
cyberspace, illegal trade in guns, free trade zones and terrorist financing.3 08 These typologies are then used to help craft the FATF's own typology reports.3 0 9 CFATF has also provided significant technical assistance
and training to its members.
IV.

PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT, FUTURE ISSUES AND THE WAY FoRwARD

In the aftermath of the plane hijackings and bombings of the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, efforts during the Bush administration to
combat the financing of transnational crime have focused very intently on
counter-terrorism enforcement. To a large extent the U.S. government
has had success in persuading the leading international organizations to
proactively engage in the design, implementation and enforcement of
counter-terrorism financial enforcement. Increasingly, international organizations are establishing groups and mechanisms to ensure implementation and sanctions against countries or private sector persons who do not
fulfill the new rules. The implications for national governments and international organizations include the establishment of a new enforcement
regime with new substantive and procedural laws and new institutions,
such as an FIU.
(noting funds approved to assist South American countries in fighting money
laundering).
305. See Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Overview, at http://
www.cfatf.org/eng (last visited Mar. 15, 2005) (summarizing activities of Caribbean
Financial Action Task Force).
306. See, e.g., Press Release, CFATF Secretariat, IADB Project (Feb. 19, 2003),
available at http://www.cfatf.org/news/viewnews.asp?pk-news=1 2.
307. See CAFATF, Revised CFATF 19 Recommendations (revised Oct. 20, 1999), at

http://www.cfatf.org/eng/recommendations/cfatfrev/index.pdf
recommendations).

(outlining

308. See CAFATF, The CFATF Money Laundering Typology Programme (1998), at

http://www.cfatf.org/eng/annrep/97-98.html (discussing typology exercises conducted by task force); see also CAFATF, Summary (1998), at http://www.cfatf.org/
eng/annrep/97-98.html (discussing results of terrorist financing typology
exercise).
309. See FATF, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2002-2003 (Feb. 14,

2003), at http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/TY2003_en.pdf (outlining process to
prepare FATF typologies).
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In looking at the future, we must focus on some basic issues posed by
persons who are analyzing the anti-money laundering enforcement
3 10

regime:

1. Are multilateral conventions working? Are they solutions? Yes, to
some extent multilateral conventions work, insofar as they constitute only
one of many tools of international policy. They work by disrupting transnational organized crime and other criminal groups. They work insofar as
they impose a legal obligation on states and can be implemented effectively. In that regard, most new multilateral conventions, such as the U.N.
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the proposed
U.N. Convention on Transnational Corruption, have anti-money laundering provisions.
They are not total solutions insofar as they do not address the underlying causes of certain types of criminality, such as transnational terrorism.
As long as the underlying causes from which terrorism and other crimes
emanate are not addressed, anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism
financial enforcement are quite limited. For instance, the U.S. anti-money
laundering policy against drugs and weapons in the Americas has shortcomings because it is increasingly out of sync with the rest of the world. In
this regard, the Clinton administration sold Plan Colombia as an international counter-narcotics program even though the E.U. refused to participate because it viewed the program as a militarization of the counternarcotics efforts and a gift to the Texas helicopter industry. The Bush
administration has not tried to sell Plan Colombia as an international program, but has expanded it to include counter-terrorism.
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financial enforcement
have not worked well at stopping the flow of arms into the Americas, in
part because the U.S. government and private sector have not prioritized
the issue of halting the spread of conventional arms. One of the first acts
of the Bush administration was to block the U.N. proposed conventional
arms trafficking convention. Subsequently, the Bush administration successfully opposed the bioterrorism convention and cancelled the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty over the protests of U.S. allies. Hence, anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorism financial enforcement are not substitutes for an effective multilateral policy. Rather, they can be effective if
they are key elements of a comprehensive approach to one or more enforcement issues.
310. This discussion is from Bruce Zagaris, Money Laundering: New Challenges
and Emerging Issues, in THE 2002 COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT OXFORD CONFERENCE

ON THE

CHANGING

FACE OF

INTERNATIONAL

CO-OPERATION

IN

CRIMINALS

21sT CENTURY, 199, 219-20 (Aug. 27-30, 2002 Commonwealth Secretariat). The questions in this section were posed by Di Stafford, Commonwealth
Secretariat, at the opening of the Commonwealth Secretariat's 2002 Oxford Conference on the Changing Face of International Co-operation in Criminal Matters
in the 21st Century on August 27, 2002.
MATrERS IN THE
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The conventions are limited insofar as they have no or insufficient
mechanisms to implement their requirements. Hence, some multilateral
conventions, such as the OECD Convention Prohibiting the Bribery of
Foreign Officials, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and
the UNTOCC have established implementation mechanisms, such as
those to conduct regular oversight and evaluation of the implementation
by signatories.
2. How is international policy made? In the international anti-money
laundering and financial regulatory area, informal groups, such as the G-8,
FATF, the Basle Group and the Financial Stability Forum (FSB), make
much of the policy-which is "soft" and non-binding law-but increasingly implemented through self- and mutual-evaluation and non-cooperative mechanisms. The latter mechanisms sometimes blacklist noncooperative jurisdictions that can become the subject of economic sanctions, which are characterized as "countermeasures."
3. How are standards developed? The standards of informal groups
such as FATF and the FSB and international organizations such as the
OECD are developed through exercises and meetings of representatives to
these organizations in conjunction with small secretariats and with no or
very limited input from other persons, such as regional-style FATF bodies,
affected non-member bodies and occasionally private persons. To the extent these groups, countries and persons are invited to comment on existing proposals, it is usually at the end of the regulatory process. To the
extent international organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank
Group have become involved, their universal membership, governance
and transparency standards have enhanced the legitimacy of the AML/
CTFE standards. Similarly, in the Western Hemisphere, the establishment
of the OAS's Multilateral Evalative Mechanism (MEM) concerning implementation of counter-drug standards has replaced the U.S. government's
own system of publishing evaluations and imposing economic sanctions
and reduced diplomatic tension. The involvement by the OECD and the
OAS in the implementation of anti-corruption laws have contributed positively to the identification of problems and education of states and interested parties.
4. To what extent are countermeasures used? FATF has begun its initiative against non-cooperative countries and has issued countermeasures
only against Nauru. It has, however, named over fifteen other jurisdictions at various points. Against these countries FATF members and nonmembers have exercised enhanced scrutiny against transactions from such
jurisdictions, thereby limiting and making more difficult such financial
transactions and services. In counter-narcotics, no countries have joined
the United States in applying economic sanctions to narco kingpins. In
counter-terrorism, the U.N., the E.U. and individual countries, such as the
United States, have sanctions. The coordination of such sanctions is still
in transition.
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What works is a mixture of multilateral efforts, such as multilateral
evaluative mechanisms, similar to those the IMF and the Organization of
American States have implemented. When the design and implementation of countermeasures are through an international organization with
universal membership and proper democratic governance and transparency mechanisms and the countermeasures are designed and implemented in accordance with international law, the countermeasures can be
effective.
What does not work is a wholly unilateral approach, such as the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report and the U.S. narcotics kingpin sanctions implemented by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control. They may work as a complement to multilateral measures.
5. Is there a level playing field? This is a controversial topic that requires a judgment on the distribution of political power and its application. To counter the arguments about the need for a level playing field,
FATF has expanded its membership-recently admitting Mexico, Brazil
and Argentina, and making South Africa an observer. In addition, FATF's
Consultation Paper, in revising the Forty Standards, provided a ninety-day
comment period open to all persons. To help establish a level playing
field, FATF is increasingly involving the IMF/World Bank to undertake
reviews. The inclusion of civil society has helped to make the decisionmaking over establishing and implementing policy more inclusive.
The IMF has prepared anti-money laundering and counter-financial
enforcement standards to include in performing evaluations of countries
in the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and offshore financial
center assessments. The IMF/World Bank has also helped improve tech31
nical assessment delivery in response to assessments and requests. ' During the second week of January 2003, the CFATF responded to the IMF/
World Bank methodology by expressing support of the goals, but recommended more collaboration with the CFATF and its members, and better
3 12
inclusion of experts from within the region in the evaluation teams.
6. What works and what does not? What works is the use of hard law
in the way of multilateral conventions and legislation by economic integration organizations (e.g., the E.U.) together with soft law combined with
mutual evaluation mechanisms and the potential of countermeasures. Another element that works is the establishment of common national institu311. See Bruce Zagaris, World Bank Group Proceeds on Money Launderingand Terrorism Financing Work, 19 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 78, 78-79 (2003) (discussing
progress by IMF/World Bank in addressing money laundering and counter-terrorism financial enforcement); IMF, Intensified Work on Anti-Money Laundering and
Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) (Sept. 10, 2002), at http://www.
imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/091002.htm (summarizing responses
to questionnaire regarding aspects of AML/CFT systems).
312. See Bruce Zagaris, Caribbean FATF Dialogues with IMF/World Bank on Proposed Methodology, 19 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 77, 77 (2003) (noting CFATF response to AML/CFT methodology prepared by FATF and IMF/World Bank).
http:/ /www.ofii.org/insourcing/insourcing-study.pdf.
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tions, such as the FlUs, along with an international counterpart, the
Egmont Group. The establishment of common specialized law enforcement institutions facilitates common legislative, regulatory and enforcement approaches. The Egmont Group helps networking among FIUs.
In CTFE efforts, what does not work is to violate the rule of law by
using a war paradigm against a criminal phenomenon. This is especially
true when governments violate basic international human rights by detaining persons indefinitely without access to courts or lawyers, freeze assets of
persons without affording them ample due process to contest their designation and refusing to allow the unfreezing of assets so that the asset holders can continue their basic subsistence and hire counsel of their choice.
In CTFE, it does not work to dismantle the charitable organizations that
provide humanitarian assistance in sensitive parts of the world, such as
Palestine, unless governments simultaneously provide adequate substitutes
for humanitarian assistance and provide ways to enable people to make a
living. Similarly, unless U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere and the
rest of the world succeeds in delivering jobs, basic living standards and
democratic institutions, the CTFE will not improve, but diminish U.S.
security.
The economic costs and privacy losses of AML and CTFE are significant. The twin budget and balance of payments deficits have caused, for
the first time in fifty years, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United
States to decline precipitously. The revulsion to the perception of unilateral, extraterritorial U.S. regulatory and enforcement authority, and the
reduced value of the dollar and returns on U.S. direct investment is causing foreigners to withdraw their money from the United States and is causing others to simply defer making new U.S. FDI. For instance, on October
19, 2004, the Organization for International Investment released a study
showing that the flow of FDI into the United States plummeted from a
peak inflow of $314 billion in 2000 to just $29.8 billion in 2003, a drop of
313
more than ninety percent.
The real challenge for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism
financial enforcement laws is the effort to simultaneously expand significantly the components of due diligence (e.g., the need to make suspicious
transaction reports (STRs)) and the persons covered (e.g., security brokerdealers, insurance companies and trust and corporate service providers
and gatekeepers) while meeting the demands of a responsible international organization for governability, transparency and democracy. The
sweeping proposed transformations of law will not happen overnight without the potential of sacrificing their legitimacy. In the meantime, interna313. See Alison Bennett, U.S. Policy Should Recognize Major Role Of Foreign Firms
REP. FOR EXEC., Oct. 20, 2004, at G-7; MatthewJ.
Slaughter, InsourcingJobs: Making the Global Economy Work for America, 15 (Oct.
2004), at http://www.ofii.org/insourcing/insourcing-study.pdf (detailing foreign
direct investment (FDI) capital flows into United States from 1994 to 2004). http:/
/www.ofii.org/insourcing/insourcing-study.pdf.
in U.S. Economy, OFII Says, DAiLY
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tional and national legal systems must accommodate the legal and
diplomatic tensions that will inevitably arise and produce challenges because of fundamental rights and lucanae.
Internationally what is needed are institutions with universal membership making decisions, operating with transparency, governance, and
linked to regional and bilateral mechanisms. More uniform national institutions (e.g., FIUs) and laws are required. On a national level, strengthened centralized direction for CFE is required with high-level supervision,
such as the National Security Council. In fact, on March 3, 2003, U.S.
Treasury Secretary John Snow announced the creation of a new Executive
Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (EOTF/FC) reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary. The Office has the responsibility of
coordinating and leading the Treasury Department's efforts to combat terrorist financing and other financial crimes, both within the United States
3 14
and abroad.
International human rights provide a sword for private sector persons
who are impacted by the privatization of law enforcement and may be the
targets of criminal and law enforcement proceedings. Yet, the international human rights institutions and mechanisms have not kept pace and
sometimes are not always as well integrated into the new conventions and
regimes as they should be. Some IGOs, such as the Commonwealth Legal
Secretariat, have endeavored through conferences and consultations to
keep the balance in their programs. International human rights institutions and mechanisms, however, have trouble when they collide with the
war and national security paradigms, whether they are directed against the
"war on drugs," the "war on organized crime" or the latest "war on terrorism," even when the wars are still being waged simultaneously and despite
the fact that some "wars" (e.g., the "war on drugs") have been fought now
for over three decades.
At the time, IGOs imposed the Eight Special Recommendations
adopted by FATF in December 2001; most countries had substantial unfinished AML work on all levels (e.g., legislative, financial and enforcement
systems). For instance, some countries were still trying to establish FIUs,
extend predicate crimes to all serious crimes. The new CTF enforcement
requirements, especially the imposition of the requirement to check
names against multiple international and even national lists (e.g., the
United States), are major legislative, administrative and resource burdens
on countries in the Americas. They must meet these requirements as part
of a series of counter-terrorism enforcement requirements, including the
U.S. Container Security Initiative, the upgrading of security at airports,
314. See Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Creates Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial
Crimes (EOTF/FC), 19 IN'r'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 175 (2003) (summarizing responsibilities of EOTF/FC); Press Release, U.S. Treasury Department Office of Public
Affairs, U.S. Treasury Department Announces New Executive Office for Terrorist
Financing and Financial Crimes, (Mar. 3, 2003), at http://wwwustreas.gov/press/
release/js77.htm (same).
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notification of the United States of aircraft passengers, substantial immigration changes and so forth. These new requirements, while part of the
international system, arise mainly from the U.S. reaction to the attacks of
September 11, 2001. At the same time, access to the U.S. financial system
is restricted by the AML changes in the USA PATRIOT Act and the demands of the Qualifying Intermediary Regulations. Simultaneously, their
emigrants have more difficulty entering the United States, remaining once
they enter due to new immigration law restrictions and making remittances. All these requirements and burdens come at a time when travel
and commerce are choked by the parallel occurrences of slackened economic demand due to post-9/11 and the Iraq attack.
Part of the ability of the U.S. government to sustain the AML and CTF
enforcement regime will be the extent to which the world endorses and
wholeheartedly and enthusiastically implements the mechanisms. The
premise of the USA PATRIOT Act and the export control and CTF enforcement regulations is that, as the superpower and the greatest market
in the world, the U.S. government can charge a premium for its regulatory
and enforcement machinery. For the first time in five decades, however,
FDI into the United States not only has not grown, but also has declined
rather precipitously. Indeed, the G-7 finance ministers expressed concern
over the twin evils of the U.S. budget and trade deficits and its drag on the
international economy. 3 15 Even more importantly, the ability to attract
foreigners to buy U.S. bonds does not compare to the period of the late
1970s and 1980s or even the 1990s. Arab-Americans have pulled and continue to withdraw their assets from the United States out of fear of U.S.
sanctions, revulsion to U.S. foreign policy in the region and declining returns on their investments. Other persons around the globe are also starting to withdraw or just not select the United States as their main channel
of investment. They are partly concerned about the overreaction by the
Bush administration in terms of privacy and regulation, the adverse returns on their capital and the increasing diplomatic isolation of the
United States.
The new demands on the countries' AML and CTF regulatory and
enforcement systems come with the usual rhetoric that technical, financial
assistance will be forthcoming, and of course, that evaluations and "naming and shaming" will follow. Although many countries support the demand for strengthened AML and CTF mechanisms, they are sensitive to
the costs these measures may have for development, especially at a time
when many economies are suffering a significant economic downturn.
Many of the countries, especially the ones who have been on blacklists, are sensitive to new requirements unless they will have ownership of
the formulation, application and enforcement of the rules. Hence, many
315. See Filippis Vittorio, G7 Leaders Say 'Twin' U.S. Deficits a Crisis for Global
Economy (Apr. 18, 2005), at http://www.watchingamerica.com/liberation000015.
htmi.
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Western Hemisphere countries will monitor and try to influence any
restart of the FATF/NCCT process.
Globalization, liberalization and free trade enable persons increasingly to develop various entities and products to move money. The development of the new international financial architecture (NIFA) and
corporate governance by the Financial Stability Forum, which the IMF has
taken over, have brought a web of interlinked "quasi-legal, global standards"3 1 6 that IGOs are developing to minimize the bumps in globalization brought by the contagion from the Asian and other regional crises.
As the soft law standards of IGOs evolve slowly into hard law, banks, financial institutions, nation-states, businesses and other interested persons necessarily must conduct their affairs in increasingly gray areas. The new risks
brought by the fluidity of the soft law standards implemented with increasing countermeasures will require more planning and attention to diverse
legal and regulatory standards.
The Egmont Group of financial investigative (also known as intelligence) units (FIUs) is developing networking among the national regulators of anti-money laundering and providing an increasing uniformity to
the anti-money laundering law.
For many years, the United States has pioneered new enforcement
mechanisms in international criminal law. The United States devised the
proactive use of enforcement liaison officials abroad, the use of undercover sting operations, surveillance, controlled deliveries, anti-money
laundering and financial enforcement remedies such as asset forfeiture.
Until now, the United States has pioneered many new techniques in CFT
enforcement, persuading the U.N., the FATF and other organizations to
proactively adopt its proposed mechanisms. The ability to continue to
lead internationally on innovative institutions and mechanisms will require continued credibility and trust internationally. The perception that
the United States adamantly refused to participate and even harmed some
of the major proposed humanitarian and/or enforcement mechanisms
and institutions, including the Kyoto Treaty, the conventional arms convention, the landmines treaty, the International Criminal Court, the cancellation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, the
conceptualization and proactive use of the "war paradigm" for terrorist
incidents, the refusal to accord treatment according to the law of war and
international human rights conventions or the U.S. Constitution for persons detained after 9/11, the assertion of the doctrine of pre-emption to
invade Iraq 3 17 and the running dispute with North Korea, are eroding the
316. See Bruce Zagaris, Life and Annuity Products in the Context of Transformation
of the Rules Affecting Offshore FinancialCentres: Changing Rules Require Enhanced Due
Diligence - Part I, J. INT'L BANKING REG., available at http://www.ipi.com.au/ipi/

IPI.nsf/LookupPDF/emin/$file/emin.pdf.
317. See Anthony Shadid, Old Arab Friends Turn Away from US., WASH. POST,
Feb. 26, 2003, at Al (discussing Arab discontent with United States' invasion of
Iraq).
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31
credibility of the United States as a country that respects the rule of law.
Unless the U.S. government takes a more mainstream position on many of
the aforementioned issues, its ability to lead on the AML and CTF regula3 19
tory and enforcement regime will become exceedingly difficult.

In the end CTF enforcement has limited utility unless it is complemented by effective foreign policy. In that regard, the dedicated ways in
which a handful of persons self-financed their preparations for terrorism
in the United States and readily sacrificed their lives made CTF controls
difficult. Most importantly, the amounts of financing they received were
not great and did not apparently come from proceeds of crime. In the
context of the increased economic and civil liberties, costs of due diligence and the difficulties of identifying people with no criminal records
and modest amounts of wealth, the CTF enforcement regime is likely to
produce very limited results. In contrast, a more effective foreign policy
that coordinates with IGOs and especially Western Europe in dealing the
Israel-Palestine dispute in an evenhanded way will produce far more dividends than the resources invested in a CTF enforcement regime.
In terms of the U.S. AML and CTF regimes, there are no silver bullets.
The U.S. government should realize that these tools are just one of many
measures by which to respond to a horrible phenomenon. As alarming as
transnational terrorism is, the crime is a continuation of a longstanding
effort to employ violence to change policies. New forms of terrorism, such
as the bombing of the U.S. District Courthouse in Oklahoma City, the
terrorist bombing of U.S. embassies in Africa and the 9/11 terrorist incidents, reflect the reality of modern terrorism which takes advantage of
globalization and technology.
One of the prospective solutions is to require that future free trade
and economic integration arrangements include, up-front as part of the
document, more regulatory and enforcement mechanisms. This notion
seems quite futuristic to a country that had trouble including in the North
American Free Trade Agreement some very mild and passive provisions
for side agreements on the environment and labor. In effect, cataclysmic
terrorist incidents are forcing the United States, and the world, to renegotiate provisions on trade, investment and money flows on a restrictive and
ad hoc basis. One of the difficulties is that discussions are occurring in an
institutional vacuum. For instance, in the Western Hemisphere, no international organization has any meaningful authority over enforcement. As
a result, countries make promises to abide by soft law or even sign conventions. The maze of soft and hard law obligations and the lack of compli318.

SeeJOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTER-

349-59 (2004) (summarizing recent United States deviations
from rule of law and implications).
319. For an earlier discussion of this problem during the Clinton administration, see Bruce Zagaris, A Look At... The Future of Internationalism:Beyond National
Interests,WASH POST, Apr. 18, 1999, at B3 (discussing tension between United States
diplomacy and ability to combat transnational crime).
NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
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ance mechanisms, however, enable criminals to identify, spot and utilize
the lucanae or the point of weakest enforcement.
An essential requirement of a successful Western Hemisphere AML
and/or CTF enforcement regime is an institution with authority and resources to help, on a daily basis, to implement and administer the rules
and to help with compliance and enforcement. The mechanism should
be the Americas Committee on Crime Problems, which would be modeled
after the Europe Committee on Crime Problems, which functions under
the Council of Europe. 320 The Americas Committee on Crime Problems
would be under the Organization of American States. 321 In the
meantime, the countries operate on an ad hoc basis. Although there is a
meeting of the Attorneys General and Ministry of Justice of the OAS approximately once every two years, the major countries in the Hemisphere
have not given the group any authority. The region needs new leadership
with an international perspective and enough vision and stature to propose and persuade countries to invest in regional legal machinery. In this
regard, the decision by the Canadian Government to become involved in
the OAS and the Inter-American legal machinery has helped significantly.
Clearly, the form of new architecture of the Americas in the wake of
globalization and the explosion of regional free trade groups is murky.
Regionalism in the Americas in the next century will not reflect the traditional patterns of regionalism of the 1970s or 1980s. It will be a function
of the national policies of the countries of the hemisphere and the various
strategies toward regionalism and subregionalism that they represent. In
turn, these strategies will be "related to their positions in the larger hierarchy of power and trade in the Americas."3 22 In the short run, free trade
and globalization will increase opportunities for transnational criminals,
especially organized crime groups, to move money, goods, people and
technology for their own ends. Eventually governments will react, first to
individual crimes and eventually on a more comprehensive basis.
The sophisticated transformations of the law and culture mandated
by the development of an international criminal and enforcement cooper320. For a discussion of the Council's Committee on Crime Problems, see
Scott Carlson & Bruce Zagaris, InternationalCooperation in CriminalMatters: Western
Europe's InternationalApproach to International Crime, 15 NovA L. REv. 551, 551-79

(1991) (discussing European model and advocating creation of similar model in
Americas).
321. For a discussion of more comprehensive anti-crime regime development
applied to the Americas, see Zagaris, supranote 56, at 1888-1902 (suggesting need
for regional initiative on intemational criminal cooperation and criminal justice);
Bruce Zagaris & Constantine Papavizas, Using the Organization of American States to
Control InternationalNarcotics Trafficking and Money Laundering, 57 REv. INT'L DE

119-33 (1986) (advocating creation of Americas Committee on
Crime Problems).

DROIT PENAL

322. W. Andrew Axline, Conclusion: ExternalForces, State Strategies, and Regionalism in the Americas, in FOREIGN POLICY & REGIONALISM IN THE AMERICAS 199, 214

(Gordon Mace &Jean-Philippe Therien eds., 1996).
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ation regime require expertise, significant resources, substantial political
commitment, training and economic benefits.
To the extent extra-regional players (e.g., international organizations
and governments) facilitate governments and regional organizations to
control and evolve the new regime of international anti-corruption enforcement, the regime will be able to successfully combat transnational
criminals. Strategic planners should not regard transnational corruption
and related crime as static. Many of the perpetrators are clever. They
have significant and even enormous resources. They are willing to make
alliances with other criminal groups and even with governments and political leaders when such alliances are beneficial. Unless regional organizations representing diverse countries in the hemisphere and extraregional
forces in support of the international criminal cooperation and enforcement regime become equally as dynamic in devising new mechanisms, cooperative activities and overcoming traditional barriers, they will see their
power eroded and the international system will become increasingly
infected.
Small governments and extra-regional players must facilitate global
governance, wherein a shift of power and functions occur away from the
state-up, down and sideways-to supra-state, sub-state and non-state actors.3 23 The power shift must occur partly through networking and voluntary associations. Global governance and a new world order are slowly
replacing the state, which is disaggregating into its separate, functionally
distinct parts. These parts-courts, regulatory agencies (including new
ones such as FlUs), executives and even legislatures-are networking with
their counterparts regionally and extraregionally, creating a dense web of
relations that comprises a new, trans-governmental order. Current international criminal and related problems-transnational corruption, international drug trafficking, money laundering, transnational organized
crime, terrorism, bank fraud, cybercrimes and securities fraud-create
and sustain these relations. Government institutions have formed networks of their own, ranging from the OECD Working Group on Bribery,
the Basle Committee of Central Bankers, to the FATF on a universal level,
and on a regional level, the European Committee on Crime Problems,
OAS Working Group on Probity and Public Ethics, the Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Committee's (CICAD) group of money laundering
experts and the Caribbean FATF.
International organizations, governments and non-governmental organizations must facilitate networking among judges and other relevant

323. SeeJessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FoREIGN Arr., 50, 50-66 (1997) (discussing how nation-state is becoming obsolete as resources and threats that matter
disregard governments and borders and states are sharing powers that defined
their sovereignty with corporations, international bodies and proliferating universe
of citizens groups).
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officials, so that they can start a global community of laws. 324 They share

values and interests based on their belief in the law as distinct but not
divorced from politics and their views of themselves as professionals who
must be insulated from direct political influence. This global community
reminds each participant that his or her professional performance is being
325
monitored or supported by a larger audience.
Governments, universities and think tanks with criminal justice, international law, economic integration, international organizations, foreign
policy, national security studies and the like, 326 should stimulate research
and discussion on the above issues. Politicians should start the consultative process as well, so that political proposals receive consideration from
citizens of countries throughout the world. Shaping the course of relations between the governments and the world as a whole will test the ability of law to contribute positively to the dynamic change that is inevitable.
In this regard, seminars such as the one for which this paper was prepared
are a necessary component of the work to develop the conceptual foundation and dialogue to bring the change required.
324. For a discussion of integration within the intra-Caribbean system and
transnational functional relations, such as in anti-narcotics action, justice and
human rights, currencies, finance and banks, see CHRISTOPH MOLLERLEILE, CARICOM INTEGRATION PROGRESS AND HURDLES: A EUROPEAN VIEw 84-135 (1996).
325. Anne Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76
183-87 (1997) (discussing effects of disaggregation of states).
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326. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies has provided private and public fora for discussions by the Mexican Attorney General on
Mexican-U.S. drug and criminal cooperation. See Center for Strategic & International Studies, CSIS at a Glance (2005), at http://www.csis.org/about/index.htm
(stating dedication "to providing world leaders with strategic-and policy solutions
to-current and emerging global issues").
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